FOURTH PART Doctrinal ideological positions of Croatian federalist nationalism in and towards Bosnia and Herzegovina!

(Continued)

By: Prof. Enver Halilović

(Previously published - FIRST PART - SECOND PART - THIRD PART)

Fourth, the Badinter Commission of the Council of Europe did not decide on the right of the nations (peoples) of Yugoslavia to opt for self-determination and independence, but on the right of the republics to opt for self-determination and independence. The applicants to the Council of Europe for independence and sovereignty were not the nations of Yugoslavia, but its republics, regardless of the fact that the republics had a very high degree of statehood, meaning they were ethnically homogeneous.

Fifth, the referendum of Bosnia and Herzegovina for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, called to make a decision on its exit from Yugoslavia, was not called by any of the three Bosnian "nations" individually or all three together, but by the competent authority of the republic, the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nations, neither separately nor together, voted in the referendums of Bosnia and Herzegovina on independence. Its citizens voted.

By falsely claiming that the breakup of the Yugoslav federation was based on the so-called national principle, and that the breakup of the three-nation BiH, the three-nation republic of that federation, did not occur on that principle, the intention is to say that it is not normal for Bosnia and Herzegovina to have existed and to exist as a state of three nations after the breakup of the Yugoslav federation, after the Serb-Croat demarcation. The full and complete
demarcation between Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia, and thus the breakup of Yugoslavia, is not fully completed until the Serb-Croat demarcation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will also lead to the definitive breakup of Yugoslavia along national lines. Until then, Bosnia is a dead end for the national breakup of Yugoslavia and a relic of the great Yugoslav federation of nations.

For Croatian federalists, it is normal, in line with the general national principle of Yugoslavia's breakup, for Bosnia and Herzegovina to also be divided and break up.

In the general context of Yugoslavia's breakup along "national lines," Croatian separatists demand the national-territorial federalization of Bosnia, which will later break up along established administrative national lines, just as Yugoslavia broke up along national lines. The Croatian ideological narrative about the national breakup of the Yugoslav federation, if national lines are not understood as republican borders, is the theoretical basis for a logical and methodical analogy about the necessity of Bosnia and Herzegovina also breaking up as a federal relic.

4) Federalism of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a retouched concept of Serb-Croat ethnocentric neocolonialism

The all-Croatian demand, the demand of the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the political representatives of Bosnian Croats, for the national-territorial federalization of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for a Croatian entity, is essentially an expression of a unified Croatian policy, by the political representatives of the Republic of Croatia and a larger number of political representatives of Bosnian Croats, to re-establish a Croatian para-state in Bosnia and Herzegovina, supported by the Republic of Croatia and Bosnian Croats, such as the Republic of Herceg-Bosna once was. The formation of a new Croatian para-state alongside the existing Serb para-state (RS) in Bosnia and Herzegovina means making it a colony of Serbia and Croatia.

The Croatian political demand for the federalization of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a solution to the so-called national question of Bosnian Croats, as it is presented, but a path to creating a Croatian nation on the territory of BiH. It is currently being pursued before the international, especially European, and domestic public within the framework of imposing so-called legitimate elections of representatives of Bosnian Croats to the Presidency of BiH and the Croatian House in the House of Peoples of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Croatian political stance is that the federal organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the ultimate "saving" political vision for both the present and the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, this is a hypocritical, Danaean political gift. Bosnia, allegedly, gains political peace and stability, and Bosniaks get their national entity/sub-state/republic, a future state. However, this is a hypocritical, Danaean political gift. Neither Bosnians nor Bosniaks accept it.

Ugo Vlaisavljević has an explanation for the Bosniak rejection of this gift that is only understandable and acceptable to himself. According to him, Bosniaks do not accept such a gift because of their special relationship with Bosnia, because they do not accept a part but want the whole of Bosnia, which I will discuss in more detail elsewhere in this text.

The Croatian demand for the federalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not stem from a real social need; it stems from the Croatian politicization of the minority status of Bosnian Croats, which cannot be changed by any political measures.

The federalization of Bosnia is a mantra about Croatian endangerment and the danger of their existence due to their smaller numbers compared to Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs.

However, instead of civic equality that levels all collective differences to a common denominator, they demand administrative equality of national-territorial entities. The demand for ethnic, "national," territorial federalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a political, peacetime, continuation of achieving the ultimate goal of Serb/Croat war ideology in and towards Bosnia. It is theoretically based on the understanding that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a three-nation state defined by the "neither-nor" logic.

Therefore, it can be neither finally divided nor fully integrated. Hence, its federal constitutional and political organization is necessary, it is said. Defining BiH as a three-nation state, on the one hand, legitimizes the necessity of federalizing the Federation of BiH, and, on the other hand, justifies the existence of Republika Srpska. The federal political organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, packaged in its three-nation definition, advocated by Croatian ideologues, is not a final solution for its state existence and survival, but the first, transitional stage of its disappearance, breakup. The current satisfaction of ethno-territorial nationalisms is the path to the peaceful, gradual, final dissolutive deconstruction
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its final disappearance.

The ethno-territorial/federal/consociational constitutional and political organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina is of no essential political significance for Bosnia and Herzegovina in itself, because its society is neither three-nation nor multinational to require its political organization to be formed based on that. It is three-cultural, or rather multicultural, like all other societies in all countries of the world. The theoretically unfounded ideology of the three-nation composition of Bosnian society is a political alibi for its federalization, and ultimately, its disappearance.

In essence, the federalization of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina leads Bosnia and Herzegovina into the political situation that socialist Yugoslavia found itself in during the 1990s, which, given the historical experience with Yugoslavia, means that it does not resolve the issue of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state of BiH, but leads to its breakup. Not only is the influence of Serbia and Croatia on Bosnia and Herzegovina not excluded, but it is strengthened, intensified, and politically legitimized.