Why can't the OHR leave Bosnia and Herzegovina yet?

For NAP writes: Prof. Dr. Hazim Bašić, member of the Presidency of the Circle 99

Some political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been insisting for years that the time for the OHR has passed. Thus, statements like 'BiH must decide its own destiny', 'there is no longer a need for a high representative', 'BiH is not a sovereign state because there is a high representative', have become an unavoidable part of the political rhetoric of SNSD. However, reality shows the exact opposite: the louder the statements about sovereignty, the more destructive the actions of these actors are to the very state whose sovereignty they invoke. At the same time, these same political forces systematically and deliberately block the fulfillment of all conditions necessary for the OHR to complete its mission.

The Office of the High Representative (OHR) can only be closed when Bosnia and Herzegovina fulfills five clearly defined conditions and two political goals, known as the "5+2" agenda, set by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board back in 2008. These conditions are: resolving the issue of state and military property, the rule of law, the financial sustainability of the state, and political stability. Bosnia and Herzegovina has only met two out of the seven criteria (the status of Brčko District and the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement). The key reasons for the delays lie in the refusal of entity and ethno-national political structures to respect the decisions of state institutions and the international order.

Sovereignty as a cover for secession

Below is a brief analysis of the conditions that have not yet been met and the attitudes of certain political subjects towards these conditions.

State property. SNSD led the adoption of a law that appropriates state property as entity property, despite the rulings of the Constitutional Court of BiH. The primary motive is to strengthen entity autonomy and weaken the state of BiH, and later to plunder that same property.

Military property. The party blocking the fulfillment of this condition is again SNSD, which refuses to register military locations to the state, thereby obstructing the effective functioning of the Armed Forces of BiH. The registration of prospective military property to the state is also a condition for BiH's path to NATO, and thus for the stability of the armed forces, the state, and the region. An additional motive for this blockade could be the potential preparation for the establishment of an entity parallel military structure.

Political stability. SNSD openly threatens secession, ignores the decisions of the High Representative and the Constitutional Court of BiH, and seeks to establish parallel institutions. Their rhetoric about 'sovereignty' is actually a means to weaken the state framework, with the support of Serbia and Russia, and with the assistance of a part of the international partners who do not want a functional BiH, but rather BiH as a permanently frozen conflict.

Constituent demagoguery

On the other hand, HDZ BiH formally (at least in the public sphere) advocates for the European path and membership in the EU. However, their actual policy systematically blocks key elements of the agenda.

Financial sustainability. HDZ has repeatedly used budget decisions to blackmail regarding the Election Law and the so-called 'legitimate representation'. Together with SNSD, they use budget issues for political conditioning (e.g., the law on the Constitutional Court, the Election Law). This policy instrumentalizes the financial system for ethno-national goals. Also, HDZ blocks legislative and budget processes when election results do not suit them (e.g., blocking the formation of the FBiH Government after the 2018 elections).

The years-long blockade in the formation of the FBiH Government after the 2018 elections is perhaps the clearest example of the abuse of the ethnic veto in post-Dayton BiH. HDZ BiH, with support from Zagreb and tacit encouragement from Brussels, openly conditioned participation in power on the achievement of political goals that have no direct connection with election results, but rather with a retrograde political goal. Through their political actions today, HDZ serves as a silent ally of SNSD in dismantling the state apparatus.

Rule of law. For HDZ BiH, the existence of the OHR is acceptable only in cases where it protects their political goals (e.g., amendments to the Election Law and the Constitution of FBiH); otherwise, the legality of the OHR becomes questionable for them. Furthermore, by advocating for 'federalization' and institutional ethno-national redistribution, HDZ attempts to cement a political imbalance that prevents a functional, democratic state and civil society. By insisting on 'constituent status' (a term whose meaning most politicians do not understand and misuse) instead of equality of citizens, HDZ blocks real reforms on the European path. At the same time, SNSD also contributes to the non-fulfillment of this criterion through legislative decisions against the BiH Constitution and the non-recognition of the OHR.

Why we don't want to be 'on our own land'

The irony of the political moment in BiH is that those who demand the departure of the OHR the most contribute the most to its remaining. Their public rhetoric about 'foreigners leaving' is actually a smokescreen for activities that destroy the foundations of the state, and thus the conditions for its independent functioning. The mechanisms of destruction are sophisticated: from legislative changes, through symbolic threats, to coordinated blockades.

SNSD has been insisting for years that the OHR should leave, that BiH 'is not a protectorate', and that 'no one needs to tell us what to do'. But at the same time: they pass entity laws on property - contrary to the decisions of the Constitutional Court, they threaten secession and the formation of parallel institutions, they refuse to recognize and implement the decisions of the OHR and the Constitutional Court of BiH.

Seventeen years after the definition of the "5+2" agenda, BiH is still a hostage of entity and ethno-national resistance to a functional state. The key points of blockage come from structures that want to weaken the state of BiH or redefine it according to entity and ethnic exclusivity.

As long as the High Representative has to intervene to preserve the basic elements of the Dayton order, it is clear that the conditions for closing the OHR have not been met and that the obstacles are politically motivated, not technical.

If the OHR were to leave today, without fulfilling the conditions of the "5+2" agenda, BiH would face a real collapse of the institutional order, with a weakened judicial apparatus and a political class whose survival is based on blackmail, blockade, and ethnic antagonism.

The closure of the OHR must happen, but not as part of a political reward for ethno-nationalists, but as a result of genuine internal reform. In the current political moment, the presence of the OHR is not only justified but necessary.