'Schindler's List' for Southeast Europe

'Observer' recently published a column titled 'Putin-Balkan Isolation: A Manual', by John Schindler. In this article, the author promotes some new political redrawing of the Balkans which, in fact, are not new.

Because Schindler's ideas are merely a copy of ideas published somewhat earlier in Foreign Affairs magazine, in an article titled 'The Balkans' Dysfunction', by Timothy Less, a former British diplomat who served as head of the diplomatic office in Banja Luka, the capital of the Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then as political secretary of the British Embassy in Macedonia. In his article, Less advocates for a comprehensive redrawing of existing state borders in the Balkans: a hypothetical Greater Serbia would embrace the existing Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the internationally recognized Republic of Montenegro; Greater Croatia would encompass a future Croat entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Greater Albania would include Kosovo and the western part of Macedonia. Less and Schindler agree that such territorial redrawing should finally bring lasting peace and stability to the region.

Of course, it is easy to claim that both Schindler and Less are now just 'free agents', and that their pamphlets have nothing to do with the policies of their former employers. However, the problem is that certain circles within the foreign policy establishment in Great Britain and the United States have, in their numerous initiatives from 1990 to the present, consistently advocated ideas identical to those in the aforementioned two articles, such as the creation of hypothetical mono-ethnic greater states – Greater Serbia, Greater Croatia, and Greater Albania – which would supposedly lead to lasting stability in the Balkans, with the collateral damage of the complete disappearance of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Of course, such ideas have always been beneath the surface of official British and American foreign policy, but they have never disappeared, as indicated by the 'coincidence' of the almost simultaneous appearance of Schindler's and Less's articles in renowned Anglo-American magazines.

The ideas promoted by Schindler and Less are based on the seemingly convincing assumption that local nationalisms will always create increasing instability in the Balkans as long as existing greater-state projects are not realized. However, history has clearly shown, both in the Balkans and elsewhere in the world, that such assumptions are merely a substitution of theses. Because the very concept of consolidated ethno-national states is a concept that has always led to lasting instability wherever it has been applied, as such ethno-national territories cannot be created without the use of brutal force and violence against certain 'unsuitable' parts of the population, using techniques that have become known as ethnic cleansing and genocide. The logic of 'solving national issues' by creating ethnically pure greater states has always led to lasting instability, never to long-term stability. Let us recall the efforts of the German ruling oligarchy to create such a state during World War II, and try to imagine what the world would look like if their geopolitical project had been recognized and accepted in the name of 'stability', as Schindler and Less are now proposing for some other geopolitical projects based on ethnic cleansing and genocide.

What is particularly interesting when it comes to 'solving national issues' in the Balkans is the flexibility (i.e., arbitrariness) of the proposed and implemented 'solutions' so far. First, the victors of World War I, among whom British and American officials held leading positions, advocated for the creation of a common national state of South Slavs at the Peace Conference in Versailles. Then, some 70 years later, a member of the British foreign policy establishment, Lord Carrington, chaired the international Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague, where he oversaw the division of that same state in the name of 'solving national issues' among the republics that were part of it. Together with the Portuguese diplomat, Jose Cutileiro, Lord Carrington then presented the first pre-war plan for the ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Carrington-Cutileiro Plan), again in the name of 'solving national issues' among the ethnic groups living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this plan was eventually accepted, with minor corrections, at the international conference in Dayton.

And now, once again, another plan for the fragmentation of Balkan states is emerging, again in order to 'solve national issues'. All that is needed is some international conference to verify such a plan and announce its implementation, and the Balkans would once again be turned upside down. Therefore, it is not surprising that such a conference on the Western Balkans has already been scheduled for 2018 in London.

However, how to make the proposed dismemberment' of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, and the absorption of Montenegro into Greater Serbia, politically acceptable to the population of the Balkans, as well as to the entire international community?

What is needed to achieve such a task is a scenario that would lead to the alternative of division and annexation of sovereign states becoming even less acceptable. It is not difficult to imagine that only war, or the threat of war, could represent such an alternative. However, the probability of the war option is very low, given that no country in the Balkans has the capacity and resources – military, financial, or demographic – to wage a serious war, and their leaders are too aware of this to even attempt such an adventure.

However, in such a context, the available option would be to create an atmosphere that simulates an imminent threat of war, by constantly raising nationalist tensions between and within the countries of the region. Of course, such tensions have existed since 1990, but through a long-term campaign, they could accumulate to such an extent that the illusion of the inevitability of a new war in the Balkans is created.

It is interesting that after the appearance of Less's article, and simultaneously with the publication of Schindler's text, tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia began to rise significantly. Such an increase in tensions can hardly be treated as a coincidence, considering that Balkan leaders are always easily turned against each other whenever they receive a signal, false or real, that major global players are once again considering a geopolitical rearrangement of the region. As they are already accustomed to raising internal and inter-state tensions as the primary means of their own political survival, it is quite likely that they will accumulate such tensions to the point where the mirage of an impending regional war gradually begins to form. And part of such a campaign is the systematic spread of rumors across Europe that war in the Balkans is inevitable and will certainly happen during 2017 or 2018.

In a simulated atmosphere of inevitable war, a radical geopolitical restructuring of the entire Balkans, with the dismemberment of existing states previously declared dysfunctional, and their absorption into hypothetical greater states, could become politically acceptable. All that is needed is to present these two options to each other, as the only available alternatives: this 'peacekeeping' option and a staged projection of an impending war, with the offer to implement the former at an international conference, such as the one planned for 2018 in London.

All that is needed to realize the proposed geopolitical rearrangement of the Balkans is to spread the perception that the constant rise of political tensions in the region inevitably leads to renewed armed conflict. In such a context, all substitutions of theses about the usefulness of geopolitical redrawing in the Balkans will easily gain the necessary level of legitimacy, so that they can finally be realized and verified at the London conference on the Western Balkans in 2018.

Of course, if this happens, it can only lead to increased hostility and lasting instability in the region and Eastern Europe, which, in turn, can lead to increased instability throughout Europe. We can only ask ourselves, is this precisely the desired end result for those who promote greater-state projects in the Balkans as a supposed path to its stability?