Consociation as Ideological Fog: How Ignorance Turns into a Political Indictment Against Sarajevo

For NAP writes: Prof. Dr. Hazim Bašić, member of the Presidency of Krug 99

In the public space of Bosnia and Herzegovina, texts are increasingly appearing that, under the guise of political theory, attempt to impose the consociational model as the "natural" and "original" order of BiH. These texts regularly share two common characteristics: ignorance of the consociational model itself and the need to label Sarajevo as the main culprit for the country's political crisis. The latest column by Prof. Dr. Ugo Vlaisavljević in this series represents an almost textbook example of such intellectual manipulation.

The author begins his text by constructing the concept of "political Sarajevo," which is offered not as an analytical category, but as a label. Sarajevo is described as a "homogeneous," "stifling," "monotonous" environment, akin to a "small village community." In doing so, the city is not analyzed but disqualified. This disqualification lacks any data, any empirical fact, any serious analysis of political pluralism, elections, social divisions, or ideological differences. "Political Sarajevo" is a rhetorical figure, not a concept. Its purpose is not to explain reality, but to delegitimize a political and symbolic space.

However, the essential problem of the column lies not in insulting Sarajevo, but in the way the concept of consociational democracy is misused. The author confidently claims that BiH is "consociational in its foundations," that it is the "formula of ZAVNOBiH," and that all who do not accept this live in a "hallucination." The only problem is: none of that is true.

Consociational democracy was theoretically formulated by Arend Lijphart in the late 1960s, as an exceptional, temporary, and contextual model for deeply segmented societies. It is based on four clearly defined principles: grand coalition of political actors (not ethnic communities), proportional representation, mutual veto, and a high degree of autonomy for social segments. This model was not developed as an ideal of democracy, but as a second-best solution in societies where liberal democracy is not possible at a given historical moment.

None of this exists in the resolutions of ZAVNOBiH. ZAVNOBiH does not establish a people's veto, does not introduce ethnic proportionality in decision-making, does not divide political power by segments, nor does it constitute ethnic groups as holders of sovereignty. On the contrary, its key formula: "neither Serbian, nor Croatian, nor Muslim, but also Serbian, and Croatian, and Muslim" is directly contrary to the consociational logic of segmentation. It is anti-ethnic, integrative, and civic in its essence. To claim that ZAVNOBiH is an "exemplary consociation" means either not knowing what consociation is or consciously falsifying history.

An additional problem is the author's retroactive projection of a contemporary theoretical model onto the context of 1943. Consociation did not exist as a theory then, nor did the partisan leaders build an order based on ethnic veto and proportionality. Socialist Yugoslavia was a one-party, centralized federation, not a consociational democracy. Equating communism and consociation is not a brave thesis, but a categorical error.

Equally problematic is the claim that BiH "can only survive as a political community of three equal peoples." This is not a description of reality, but a normative demand that directly negates the citizen as a political subject. Such a stance is not in line with liberal democracy, European law, or the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. It produces a system in which ethnic elites become permanent sovereigns, and veto mechanisms become instruments of constant blackmail and blockade.

The experience of BiH clearly shows this. Mutual veto is not a "self-regulating mechanism," as Lijphart optimistically assumed, but a normalized tool of political obstruction. Its constant use does not lead to stability, but to permanent crisis. This is not an accidental deviation, but a structural consequence of the consociational order in a society that is not historically deeply segmented, but has been violently ethnicized by war and post-war policies.

In this context, insisting on consociation does not represent realism, but an ideological escape from democracy. When the author claims that BiH can only survive under an "absolute sovereign," sometimes Tito, today the High Representative, he is actually admitting the defeat of his own political vision. If the alternative to democracy is dictatorship, then the problem is not with Sarajevo, but with that vision itself.

Therefore, it must be clearly stated: consociation is neither the foundation of BiH, nor its democratic goal, nor a European standard. Criticism of the consociational model is not some "Sarajevo hallucination," as it is being portrayed, but a well-founded position of contemporary political theory and European law. From Donald Horowitz and Brian Barry, through Juan Linz and Adam Przeworski, to local authors like Dr. Slaven Kovačević, the argument is the same: consociation entrenches ethnic elites, produces permanent blockades, and sidelines the citizen as the holder of sovereignty. Kovačević, in his works, shows that such an order is in direct conflict with the European Convention on Human Rights and the judgments of the European Court, thus making consociation in BiH cease to be a political "realism" and become a constitutional-legal problem.

Sarajevo, with all its flaws and weaknesses, is not an obstacle to the development of democracy in BiH. The real obstacles are theoretically unfounded models, political labels, and authors who use concepts as weapons, not as tools of thought.