Cantons were a good foundation for the guerrilla struggle of the pro-Bosniak bloc for the state, but too small a pond for the patriotic economists in SDA!

By: Rasim Belko @rasimbelko

After High Representative Christian Schmidt imposed government tailored to the OHR and its bosses by suspending the Constitution of the FBiH entity, it was expected that at lower levels (cantons) a synchronized political mechanism would be established. Because, after attacks on the constitutional and legal order and the exclusion of Bosniaks from the decision-making system, organized action by pro-Bosniak forces was necessary in the space that was then the only one left free.

And it seemed that the formation of government in three predominantly Bosniak cantons would, in a way, be an opportunity for a partisan-style guerrilla policy that would strive to resist the colonial approach of the international community. Because, on that guerrilla political side were those who resisted the pliers of power embodied in the OHR and the embassies of the USA and Great Britain.

Ultimately, it turned out that it only seemed that way. Because, from the guerrilla policy on which future projects should have been capacitated for the sake of Bosnia and Herzegovina's fate, only the bitterness of failure remained. This policy, at a bad moment for the state and society, had to be a cohesive factor for gathering all forces, networking, and adapting, so that when the time came, it would transform into a serious political mechanism ready to deal with even stronger factors of the international community.

The formation of pro-Bosniak governments on the foundations of projected guerrilla policies in USK and TK, and after half a year in ZDK, gave an indication of possible success. And then everything collapsed like a house of cards. Or, more accurately, it was brought down for the sake of ruthless, and I will take the liberty to say anti-state interests, of groups and individuals. Because, that is the only truth. And no matter how much the story of the collapse of the idea of a pro-Bosniak struggle is embellished by those most responsible for that collapse, the clear conclusion in the end is that even the largest Bosniak and, let's say, pro-Bosniak party fails to deal with groups that target functional public companies for personal enrichment under the banner of patriotism. And Bakir Izetbegović can try to justify himself with the story of a letter and opposition to such groups, but without serious cuts, all of this makes no sense, because these interest groups have broken the spirit and body of the pro-Bosniak bloc.

SDA was expelled from power after the elections, primarily due to American policy, and SDA, due to the tycoon policy of its people, destroyed the pro-Bosniak story of resistance. Because, the story of pro-Bosniak today has no tangible support, the largest party has no trump card with which to convince possible partners to trust them. Because, they have sold all those who were their partners, for one reason or another, due to the interests of insatiable personnel seekers for whom the budget bag is never deep enough.

And as long as it does not change the relationships within itself, SDA and its leader, as well as its cadres, have neither the right nor the basis to talk about what anyone should do and how. Because, the largest party in BiH has abandoned those who, for the sake of the state, went into opposition themselves. And such action is called treason.

Nonsense, the president of the SDA Main Board, Safet Softić, will tell us when asked if it is true that he is one of the leaders of the process of breaking up the pro-Bosniak bloc at the cantonal level. And nonsense is actually what he is saying today, that “SNSD and HDZ are leading projects while the Trojka is inferior.” Because, for that to make sense, SDA must have a vision and readiness to change such policies. For that to be possible, it must have partners, and to have partners, it must first tighten the leash on the obviously unrestrained interest-based tycoon groups. And yes, it is nonsense that the Trojka's inferiority compared to SNSD and HDZ absolves SDA of responsibility. The opposition is not the government, but it is still a serious position in parliamentary benches from which much can be done, if one thinks about the state and not personal accounts.

And the People's European Party and the Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the best indicators. First, they went into opposition when they could have been in power, and second, their cadres, unlike SDA's more or less critical actions, still send initiatives, legislative proposals, and the like in parliaments. The Democratic Front also has assets in its actions through parliaments. SDA does not, because being in power has apparently deprived them of the ability and capacity to offer solutions as the opposition.

However, let's return to the possibilities of struggle through the guerrilla policy of the pro-Bosniak bloc. Didn't the Trojka project start precisely on the foundations of cantonal struggle with SDA? And that only in one canton, the Sarajevo one. From that level, it rose to the federal, and then to the state level. The Trojka had the help of the international community - yes, and? If the pro-Bosniak policy in the three cantons had held on as it should have, it would have had plebiscitary support from all those who want to see Bosnia and Herzegovina as a modern, integral state, close to the EU and NATO.

Tuzla is the most populous canton in the country and plays a significant role in electoral calculations, and neither ZDK nor USK are negligible considering the voter base. The wave that was projected to start from these three cantons would easily spread to Sarajevo Canton, and further, because true patriots of this country need a political project they can trust and elect because of the solid foundations on which it is established. And now all of that is the artificial smoke of studio shows in which those who think they are leaders are washing themselves for the political power of tycoons who flatter them as presidents should be flattered.

The stalemate in the true part of the pro-Bosniak bloc means a comfortable position for those who have agreed to be puppets of Bosnia and Herzegovina's international proteges and partners of secessionists whose wishes they fulfill. This bloc is now in a position to do nothing, leaving the initiative to Dodik and Čović, and still count on good election results. To clarify for Softić and SDA, this is not nonsense, but de facto the most disastrous consequence of SDA's irresponsible approach in a time of crisis.

However, there is some good in every evil, and the only good in the collapse of such a pro-Bosniak political mechanism is the fact that we now know who must go to the back of the patriotic columns. Because, whoever is not capable of leading and managing is forced to listen and act according to instructions. SDA must accept that it has definitively lost its leadership role, and the sooner that happens, the easier it will be to find a way to organize a political mechanism that has a guerrilla approach at its core and a diplomatic approach on the surface.

Because, regardless of being the largest party, SDA is now at a crossroads between two blocs, one that comfortably drifts in composition with SNSD and HDZ, and one that has a serious pro-Bosniak character but not enough power.

SDA should face a clear choice, but before any new attempt, that party must solve the key problem known from before, highlighted after the collapse in USK. SDA bodies must make a decision whether state-building policy or the tycoon structure is more important. If they choose the former, they will have serious coalition capacity. If they choose the latter, it is not out of the question that they will become the Bosniak SDS, equally recognizable to everyone, but not sufficiently desirable to anyone. And that is dangerous for SDA and perhaps even more so for the state. However, the decision must be made as soon as possible, because dragging out the definition of positions creates a vacuum for meddling policies!