Between Genocide and the Alliance for a United Future: Bosniaks Risk Becoming 'Others', with a Capital O

A special session of the National Assembly of the RS entity, held this week, reminded many of the "Assembly of the Serb People in BiH," held in October 1991.

Since the end of the armed conflict in BiH until today, it has been difficult to find similar examples of political humiliation of Bosniaks in the RS entity.

The legitimately elected representative of Bosniaks, Senad Bratić, was removed from the position of Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly of the RS, solely for political activities within the party to which he belongs. Regardless of the detrimental impact of Bratić's SDA on the territory of the entire country, it is difficult to find justification for the political apartheid of Milorad Dodik's regime.

On the other side of the country, Dragan Čović, a follower of the Alliance for a United Future (UZP), has been "cleansing" Herzegovina of Bosniaks in recent years, and has held Mostar captive because he failed to turn it into a capital city.

In the strait between genocide and the UZP, Bosniaks, in the 21st century, have become the European Palestinians.

Bosniak cities such as Banja Luka, Foča, Doboj, Prijedor, and many others were taken from Bosniaks through war crimes. The largest part of this population is concentrated in the areas around Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, and Bihać.

What is detrimental to Bosniaks is the fact that these cities, to which they were expelled during the war or settled through misguided policies, are not connected by roads. If one looks at the map of BiH, it is easy to see that none of the listed cities with a Bosniak majority have complete road infrastructure connecting them to other cities. This is not surprising, considering that the HDZ has almost entirely managed the financial sector in BiH from the war until today.

On the other hand, in the RS territory, the Bosniak people are being denied the right to their language, and in areas ruled by Čović and Dodik, Bosniak children are forced to learn according to the educational systems of Croatia and Serbia. Part of the blame for this situation also lies with the Bosniaks themselves, who have allowed themselves to be led for three decades by a political party that is in a constant coalition with the aforementioned followers of war crimes.

It is rare anywhere in the world to find an example where the most numerous people are in a subjugated position. The responsibility for such a situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina largely lies with the international community.

In the nineties, the embargo prevented Bosniaks from exercising their right to defense; they reacted only when they saw that Milošević and Tuđman's blitzkrieg, with their pawns Karadžić and Boban, would not succeed.

The war was stopped only when the people condemned to extermination stood on their feet.

In an attempt to remove war criminals from the political scene, international policy created a political cyclops in the person of Milorad Dodik. In the first few years, Dodik was acceptable to everyone, and everyone was acceptable to Dodik.

While he was demolishing the criminal leadership of the RS in armored vehicles, acknowledging the genocide in Srebrenica, and talking about BiH as a state, Dodik benefited from international influence, and foreigners benefited from his actions.

He gradually took control of the political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When he realized the extent of his power, he became a danger. Today, he threatens everything that is not close to him, including the fragile peace established by Dayton.

This was the first failure of international policy in BiH. Failures then followed in rapid succession.

The actions of the international community in our country could be summarized by the principle of 'do it, and let God decide'.

In public discourse, it is often heard that the reform of the Armed Forces (AF) of BiH is the best-executed job. Three warring sides have donned one uniform, but have retained the insignia and historical events from the time when they were on opposing sides.

Such Armed Forces function relatively well in peacetime and on battlefields on other continents.

However, the AF of BiH are incapable of protecting BiH's border from unarmed refugees and migrants. What, then, can be expected in the event of a 'God forbid' scenario. Will the successfully reformed AF of BiH become three armies, only better trained now?

While the neighbors of Bosnia and Herzegovina are arming themselves, foreigners in Bosnia and Herzegovina are destroying weapons. Croats are buying modern weapons from the West, and Serbia from Russia and France, as if they didn't have enough left from the former common state. Against whom will Serbia defend itself that it needs so much weaponry and a Russian base in Niš? The last time it was attacked was in World War II. Croatia is in NATO, so it is a bit illogical that Slovenes, who are also in NATO, will attack it. It is even harder to expect BiH to do so, where Croats have political power. Serbia will not dare to attack Croatia. However, both Serbia and Croatia have shown, through their distant and recent history, and continue to show, territorial pretensions towards BiH. Serbia in particular, as it lost Kosovo.

One of the biggest failures of international reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the reform of the judiciary.

Foreign diplomats, with questionable ratings in their home countries, came and shaped the judicial system of BiH. The High Representative in BiH, Wolfgang Petritsch, imposed the law on the Court of BiH and the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council.

And then his successors, quite lethargic, left the reform of the judiciary to the mercy of domestic authorities. In the years that followed, the coalition of the UZP and genocide took control of the prosecutor's offices and courts. Especially the State Court and Prosecutor's Office. Because of this, Bosniaks who prevented genocide in Sarajevo, Bihać, and other BiH cities and settlements are now in the dock, while those guilty of crimes of ethnic cleansing and rape walk freely through Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region.

The judiciary is one of the fundamental pillars of the state, and the rule of law is the key to democracy. Both have stalled in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the relationship between foreigners and the dividers of BiH.

And it is not only reforms that are a detrimental segment of the international community's actions towards BiH and Bosniaks. The wave of refugees and migrants, after Europe erected fences and barbed wire, has flooded cities and villages where Bosniaks are the majority. Dodik and Čović do not allow migrants to stay in territories where Serbs and Croats are the majority.

Dodik does not allow the AF of BiH at the border; he was even bothered by the proposal for police forces from both entities to go to the border. International representatives express concern and share the spoils. Meanwhile, Bosniaks, as soon as darkness falls, secure their homes and take their children to school. The police in those parts of the country are overburdened, and crime is on the rise.

There are failures of European politicians in BiH for which it can be safely said that it is fortunate they did not succeed. The last such was Lars-Gunnar Wigemark's attempt, in cooperation with Dodik and Čović, to create "principles for establishing government." These principles would have halted BiH's NATO path, and handed over the Council of Ministers and state policy to the control of SNSD-HDZ. Although SDA leader Bakir Izetbegović signed the "principles," the wider public and political pressure, fortunately for Bosniaks, managed to prevent the realization of the dubious plan.

Wigemark has left, but those who supported, publicly or secretly, Serb/Croat policies of separation and segregation in BiH during and after the war remain.

The ambassadors of France, Italy, the European Union, and Russia prevented Milorad Dodik from being issued a warning at the last session of the Peace Implementation Council.

On the other hand, friendly neighbors almost always make an effort to portray Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina as radical and terrorist-inclined at international gatherings and meetings. Bosniaks in Serbia and Croatia are never a problem for them, only those in BiH.

Bosniaks have no reserve homeland. Under duress, Bosniaks are also being forced to change their political discourse. Greater commitment to political action in areas where they are now a minority is also necessary. Separatist policies will not tire, nor will they lose the support of Belgrade and Zagreb.

If they do not want to be 'Others' with a capital O in their homeland, or to be pushed into a mini-state by the division of BiH, Bosniaks must start electing capable individuals who can secure support in the world's centers of power for the preservation of BiH's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Without that, they will cease to exist.