And father would son: Kecmanović in the strategy of a composed state

Significantly, but not coincidentally, Milorad Dodik's response to the collapse of the August agreement of the three leaders is contextualized only after the conclusion of the announced SDA congress on September 14.

Expecting and hoping for the re-election of Bakir Izetbegović as party leader, Milorad Dodik - and his partner Čović - are not coincidentally already positioning themselves for the continuation of long-projected political goals – the confederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the model of the Vance-Owen plan (BiH divided into three ethnic republics).

With Milorad Dodik's arrival as the first man of national politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the media exploitation of the distorted Dayton falsification of the 'composed state' began. The entire project of confederalizing Bosnia and Herzegovina is, quite certainly, from the Greater Serbian Belgrade political kitchen. Nenad Kecmanović certainly has long belonged to that same kitchen, one might say since the position of the reformist political project in the process of the dissolution of the SFRY.

The 'composed state' on which Dodik so zealously politically rides - ignoring the true constitutional definition that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not composed but 'consists' of two entities - implies ignoring the state continuity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and skillfully introduces a new constitutional concept of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state union, which it is not according to its constitutional order. The derivative 'state union' has long been adopted through the term 'common institutions of BiH'. The sluggish and uninterested political public in BiH has only rarely and silently reacted to this constitutional diversion, so it has remained, distorted, in public discourse. And, as such probes yielded first results, the structures implementing the project of confederalizing Bosnia and Herzegovina were further encouraged.

The entire project, of course, cunningly offers the realization of political goals for Čović's HDZ as well as his Zagreb mentors. Because, ultimately, the whole matter of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina into three ethnically pure units satisfies both Greater Serbian and Greater Croatian political appetites. Indeed, it is on this matrix that the political alliance Dodik – Čović was created. So, the entire project implies three ethnic territories in BiH as undisputed fiefdoms of the 'constituent majority'.

Where, in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, could the first outlines of such a policy be discerned in practical terms? Despite the constitutional and legal prohibition of the entitization of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik unilaterally, and without consequences – declared the Law on Forests of the RS, and by the same law appropriated the forest land of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the property of the Republika Srpska. After that, the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina ceases to be integral, unified, becomes entity-ethnic and establishes a land-registry boundary as a new line of relations between the two entities within BiH. Is this not the realization of war aims, adjudicated before the International Court in The Hague?

Unexplainably, but a constitutional review of this move by Dodik never followed, although Dodik thereby also ignored the 'Law on Prohibition of Disposal of State Property' adopted in both the state and two entity parliaments. Neither the alleged political protectors of BiH statehood nor the OHR - as the original issuer of that law on prohibition of disposal of state property - reacted to this act by Dodik, which is the greatest unknown in analytical reading in BiH to date.

Kecmanović's interview with Glas Srpske 'Bosniaks invoke foreign intervention' confirmed that Milorad Dodik benefits the most from the non-establishment of parliamentary and executive institutions in BiH, and that his goal is to transfer the whole story from the state level to a political dialogue between the two entities, according to the model of bilateral agreement?!

Let us return again to Dragan Čović. Simultaneously with the Serb-Bosniak political clinch, a political reminiscence of the adjudicated Herzeg-Bosnia is being revived, which supports the previous theses. If Dodik succeeds in his intention of entity bilateralism, he certainly counts on Čović's support and the revived Herzeg-Bosnian resentment, and in return, the latter counts on full Dodik's support for a third confederal unit, whatever it may be called - possibly a mega canton.

They say it is harder to call someone who does not want to hear than to call a deaf person. If the alleged fighters for Bosnia do not hear, they may find themselves falling asleep in a Dayton and waking up in a confederal arrangement of the country (the confederal model in the case of BiH means a Bosniak-civic ghetto).