Well-tuned pyromaniacs and firefighters

The signatures of Milošević, Tuđman, and Izetbegović, affixed in Paris to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH, ended the suffering and the war against Bosnia.

The consequences were packaged and only superficially healed by the establishment of a new constitutional order. The starting point of the newly established constitutional solutions was based on the model of the "tragic conflicts in the region", ultimately a model of demarcation between conflicting national phalanxes.

The Hague's unraveling of the origins of the "tragedy" followed. Individual responsibilities and judgments on the degree and type of guilt of those more or less responsible were lined up.

As expected, the dynamics of relations within the international community dictated the trajectory from easier to harder, from less important to more important. Only the duration of the Court's work provides the answer.

The "tragic" ceases to be spontaneous, unpredictable, and unplanned, and becomes targeted, conceived, and executed with predictable effects according to a plan.

The two Sides, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), allegedly (and this remains disputed after Karađorđevo) engaged in joint criminal enterprises, committed joint criminal enterprises with all their consequences, and by their signatures agreed to ratify these effects with the Dayton Peace Agreement.

The March approach to the pronouncement of Radovan Karadžić's Hague verdict will round off the criminal-legal truth about the war in Bosnia, and also create the prerequisites for judicial truths to become the basis for the constitutional-legal order of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They must have a restitutive character for the attacked, internationally recognized sovereign state entity.

It is not by chance that we are living in a seemingly turbulent internal Bosnian period. It is produced by institutional followers of those convicted by The Hague, who, by the way they pose their demands, are unrealistic maximalists (preserving and obtaining greater autonomy for the RS entity - Dodik, and reviving a third entity or para-ethnic administrative unit through the back door - Čović).

The internal Bosnian exponents are merely puppets of the still-living great-power projects of Bosnia's neighboring countries. No matter how much they try to remain unnoticed, they act in unison and according to plan, following the model of PYROMANIACS and FIREFIGHTERS. They set fires in Bosnia every now and then, and those from outside put out the fires, making Bosnia a large plantation.

At the same time, pro-Bosnian forces will have to face difficult political decisions and achieve legal satisfaction by filing new lawsuits, as well as by reviving already unfavorably decided cases before another court in The Hague. Serbia and Croatia will finally be confronted with their own responsibility and guilt for the convicted joint criminal enterprises. These truths will help cleanse their societies and create the prerequisites for the restoration of the devastated Bosnian society as the only possible way to restore full statehood to Bosnia.

The game of pyromaniacs and firefighters must become their ugly and shameful past.

For the success of this great twenty-five-year struggle, Bosnian unity alone is not enough; it is almost a given. It is necessary to permanently promote the merging of ethnic nationalisms into Bosnian patriotism. This requires and calls for new political ideas and new people, ultimately a NEW ERA.