Former NATO Commander: Dodik told me about secession

(Patria) - Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, retired U.S. Admiral James Stavridis warns that Russian President Vladimir Putin could choose new targets after a potential victory in Ukraine. The first in line would be Moldova, specifically Transnistria. However, the very next step could be the Western Balkans.

Stavridis published his analysis of Putin's ambitions for Bloomberg, and we are reprinting his text in full.

- Throughout history, Russian tsars have sought ways to dominate what they called the "near abroad" of their expanding empire. In today's world, President Vladimir Putin's illegal invasion of neighboring Ukraine follows this strategic goal. If he wins, it is logical that he would turn his attention to Moldova, the next stop on the road to Eastern Europe - and where the Russian separatist enclave, Transnistria, is already occupied by Russia.

But nearby is another very attractive target: the Western Balkans. The turbulent region of southeastern Europe includes four stable members of the North Atlantic Alliance: Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. However, the Kremlin has its eyes on other targets: Serbia, Kosovo, and ethnically divided Bosnia and Herzegovina. How might Putin seek to expand Russian influence and undermine the engagement of the North Atlantic Pact and the European Union in this important corner of Europe?

I know this terrain well from my days in NATO and as a U.S. military commander in Europe. Before that, I served in the Balkan wars of the 1990s as a destroyer captain off the coast of former Yugoslavia, enforcing an arms embargo. Over the years, I have met most of the high-level leaders in the region, including Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, former Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, and Milorad Dodik, the current leader of Republika Srpska.

In the midst of the breakup of Yugoslavia, the incredibly bloody Balkan wars between 1991 and 2001 killed up to 105,000 people, many of them civilians (8,000 Muslim men and boys, for example, were massacred in Srebrenica in July 1995). Tensions remain between Roman Catholics in Croatia, Orthodox Christians mainly in Serbia, and Muslims in Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia.

Putin seeks to exploit this unfinished history. He knows that if NATO member states are drawn back into politics in the volatile Balkans, they will be distracted from their focus on supporting Ukraine.

In Kosovo, a former region of Serbia, which neither Serbs nor Russians recognize as an independent state, there are still several thousand NATO peacekeepers. Last year, the Serbian army went on high alert after ethnic Serb protesters in Kosovo injured nearly 100 NATO soldiers; this forced the Alliance to send several hundred additional peacekeepers. Putin is clearly encouraging Serbia to put pressure on the NATO-backed Kosovo government.

He is also working to destabilize the shaky government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is divided into a three-member presidency with one representative from each of the three main ethno-religious communities. The most experienced political actor is Dodik, who is closely connected to Moscow. He even told me a decade ago about the need for Republika Srpska to secede, which would effectively destroy the country. This part of the country would then merge with Serbia, creating a Greater Serbia, which Putin would gladly support.

As retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, who was my plans officer at U.S. European Command, said: "This is the same kind of challenge we faced ten years ago - Putin benefits from stirring the pot elsewhere in Europe, trying to weaken NATO's credibility and distract us from supporting Ukraine."

Fortunately, the West has options. For now, the idea of deploying NATO battalions in Ukraine is unlikely. Increasing the troop levels currently deployed in Kosovo, and overcoming the unrest that Putin is trying to foment, is possible and makes strategic sense.

This would be an example of effective regional burden-sharing within the Alliance: NATO countries in and near the Balkans (e.g., Greece and Italy) can focus on that region. Eastern European and Nordic members can take the lead in efforts in Ukraine. Large countries in the West - France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States - have enough resources to be involved in both.

In addition to stabilization forces, NATO must keep in mind that Russia uses so-called hybrid warfare. Putin is good at using social media, disinformation campaigns, and pro-Russian propaganda to create tensions beyond his borders. NATO must use its own information networks to expose and counter these false narratives. If the Russians decide to raise the stakes, they could use cyberattacks on power grids and other vital targets in Kosovo and non-Serb parts of Bosnia. This would create confusion and increase social discontent. NATO can provide better cyber defense systems to Balkan allies and friends.

Finally, there are economic incentives that can counter Russian engagement. Serbia desperately wants EU membership, as does Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their leaders want to be able to engage with the West and avoid sanctions. The Serbian ambassador to the U.S. recently wrote a letter claiming that Serbia only wants peace. Serbs can show they are sincere by rejecting Putin's manipulations and allowing the West to remain focused on its biggest challenge: Russia's immoral war in Ukraine, Stavridis concludes.