Bihać could not be a defenceless Srebrenica: The Fifth Corps broke all Serbian offensives

Croatia celebrated last weekend the 22nd anniversary of Operation Storm, which at the beginning of August 1995 liberated a large part of Croatian territory held by units of the former SAO Krajina.

That August 1995, simultaneously with Operation Storm, on the other side of the border, units of the 5th Corps of the ARBiH liberated Bihać and surrounding towns from complete encirclement after three and a half years of occupation. Over the next two months, the Fifth Corps would launch an unstoppable offensive towards the southeast of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, together with joint ARBiH units, liberate several cities and a vast area of the state of BiH. 

The Croatian state leadership these days, far more than in previous years, is emphasizing the story of Croatian merits in the liberation of Bihać and the alleged prevention of Bihać becoming a new Srebrenica.

One of the main reasons is certainly that at the end of the year, a final verdict is expected in The Hague for the Herceg-Bosnia six for the "joint criminal enterprise", and it is very likely that the final verdict will be identical to the first-instance one. 

Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković and Miroslav Tuđman gave almost identical statements: "Operation Storm prevented Bihać from becoming a new Srebrenica." 

It is no wonder for Croatian Prime Minister Plenković, who practically spent the entire war in European capitals and pleasant cities like Brussels. But Miroslav Tuđman is familiar with everything, yet he claims that the "cry of the people of Bihać" decided that they should "help". After three and a half years of a bloody siege of the Bihać Krajina, during which the Army of the Republic of BiH defended itself and launched offensive actions, today they receive military sympathy and lessons from Croatia.

After constant fighting in the spring and summer of 1994, the Fifth Corps pushed the Army of Republika Srpska 250 square kilometers eastward, then defeated and captured almost all of Fikret Abdić's units. The Serbs launched two powerful operations, "Shield" and "Spider". After bloody and heavy fighting, these operations did not bring any significant gains for the Serbian army. It was evident that the Knin Serbs and those from the RS, aided by units from Serbia, could do nothing to Bihać and were militarily almost broken. Miroslav Tuđman knows that the operation of the HV and HVO in the hinterland of Knin began after the failure of all Serbian offensives on Bihać. The constant clashes of the Fifth Corps with units of the VRS, the Army of the RSK, and numerous units from Serbia, with more than nine thousand dead on both sides, speak of who liberated Bihać and broke the strength of the RSK units and Mladić's units.  

What is common between Milošević and Tuđman in their treatment of Bihać, so the question is how Fikret Abdić was simultaneously a Serbian and Croatian servant. And how his units were always part of the forces attacking Bihać and the Fifth Corps? It could be said that Abdić was more of a Croatian than a Serbian player. The public in BiH learned this from Tuđman's transcripts. 

Tuđman, at a meeting with General Janko Bobetko on November 22, 1993, confirms this relationship with Abdić: "We have an agreement with Abdić that, if a split occurs, that is, when a split occurs, that western Bosnia will become an integral part of Croatia."

How obvious the Serbo-Croatian cooperation against the people of the Bihać Krajina was is also confirmed by the signatures of the "Joint Statement of Abdić with Boban on October 21, in the presence of Tuđman, and the "Declaration" with Karadžić in the presence of Milošević, the next day, October 22, 1993.         

In this context, unfortunately, is the tragedy of Srebrenica? The crime of genocide in Srebrenica occurred gradually, and the horror began to unfold in the spring of 1993. At that time, a major offensive by Mladić's army and units from Serbia began, reducing a vast free territory to a small enclave, which the international community then handed over to the protection of UN forces? The units of the Army of the Republic of BiH were left without ammunition and adequate weapons. While the surroundings of Srebrenica were falling and people were retreating into the city, a huge convoy with 25 trucks of weapons for the Army of the Republic of BiH was waiting in Grude from the end of February for the next month, while in Srebrenica some units were left almost without ammunition. 

In Tuzla, they waited in vain for that convoy from Grude to be able to help Podrinje. Then President Alija Izetbegović went to Zagreb and begged Tuđman to let the convoy through. That meeting is also recorded in Tuđman's transcripts. Izetbegović asks for help, and the Croatian side demands as a counter-service the relocation of the Igman ammunition factory from Konjic to Croatia. Then Gojko Šušak, then Croatian Minister of Defense, speaks up: "Alija, here in Zagreb, five planes of goods (weapons, ed.) are sitting, and three are on the way, above water. Until the (relocation of 'Igman') is completely resolved, I will not send you a single bullet."  

Not a single bullet went to the Army of the Republic of BiH, and the convoy in Grude for the Army of the Republic of BiH disappeared as if "swallowed by the earth."  

American diplomats noticed that Croatia took 50 percent of the weapons shipments for the Army of the Republic of BiH, then the Herzegovinian Croats took their share, and in the end, only crumbs remained for the Government forces."  

The HVO Finance Department on January 29, 1993, ordered the halt of all weapons shipments for the Army of the Republic of BiH. Tilman Cilh, a German humanitarian, warned of the "Croatian embargo" on weapons against BiH, although it was shocking that this embargo also applied to the Republic of Croatia. This fully explained Franjo Tuđman's attitude towards BiH.    

At the height of the worst Serbian offensives on the Krajina, only crumbs reached Bihać, mostly from Zenica, by risky helicopter transport. Bihać might have been meant to be Srebrenica, but someone's expectations were thwarted, thanks to the heroic Krajina people. 

What Croatia's intentions in BiH were is also shown by numerous documents from foreign diplomats in BiH. The Army of Republika Srpska was at that moment in complete disarray, and the ARBiH and HV were practically at the gates of Banja Luka, but the operation was stopped under pressure from international forces solely because it was assessed that there was a real danger that the Croatian army would not want to withdraw from Banja Luka and that part of BiH after liberation and hand over authority to the legitimate military and civilian authorities of the Republic of BiH.

When it comes to the liberation of Bihać and the Krajina from complete encirclement, the significant role played by the HV should not be ignored, but no one should or has the right to agree that Croatia takes all the credit for the liberation of Bihać, while the role of the ARBiH is completely ignored.

Bihać was, unfortunately, partly a victim of a policy that today presents itself as its savior.