Anti-state majority in the Constitutional Court of BiH leads to tragedy and legal destruction of the state

Decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina are final and binding in accordance with the Constitution. However, they are not unchangeable. Legal interpretations and legal positions taken in individual decisions are subject to change, in such a way that a new decision in a new case concerning the same issue, e.g., state property, takes a legal stance contrary to that in Decision U-1/11 and related decisions, and the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina states that state property belongs to the entities, not the state.

Courts, in principle, very rarely change their practice, and the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not had significant shifts so far, especially not on issues of state importance such as property, competencies, and related matters.

However, when there are changes in the composition of the court, there are also changes in legal philosophy and the way in which the new majority in the Constitutional Court treats certain issues. This is precisely the sequence of events that can lead to the reversal of legal interpretations and legal positions taken in the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The continuity of the legal practice of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the basis for all requests for the assessment of the constitutionality of legal violence in the form of legal regulations and other decisions adopted by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, which aim to attack state property, its institutions, its competencies, and ultimately the state itself by creating preconditions for the legal and de facto secession of the Republika Srpska entity.

Through its actions, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has returned the entity to the constitutional and legal framework of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and maintained the stable last line of defense against secessionism. However, it is certain that there will be changes in the structure, composition, and mode of operation of the Constitutional Court of BiH.

More precisely, the international community is very close to making another concession, fatal for the state, to the pro-Russian leader of the RS entity, Milorad Dodik, and ordering its actors in power to vote for the removal of foreign judges from the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the election of candidates according to the wishes of Dodik and Čović.

A change in the structure of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, if the Law on the Constitutional Court of BiH is ultimately adopted, means that the National Assembly of Republika Srpska will elect at least one more judge to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in addition to the current two, while the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will elect two more judges. In total, this will mean that Milorad Dodik will have three judges whose legal and judicial policy will be to judge in accordance with the worldviews of Serbian national policy and the thesis of "original Dayton" according to which even the sky and the birds flying in the sky are Serbian because it was allegedly agreed in Dayton, which is not true.

On the other hand, after the Troika delivers Vukoja, Dragan Čović has another guaranteed appointment (after Valerija Galić's retirement), and when the international community agrees to deliver what Dodik wants, Čović will also get another appointment.

Therefore, Dragan Čović will have three judges whose legal and judicial philosophy will be to judge based on facts and evidence and for the outcome to favor the third entity.

Using Vukoja as an example, Čović shows what kind of candidate he wants and what kind of candidates he will fill all positions with, including the one in the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Obedient, incompetent, and sufficiently tied to the party so that everyone knows whose man he is, yet with enough room to be presented to the public as an "independent" candidate. A combination that, in the political alliance of HDZ-SNSD, will be favorable to their political and territorial ambitions.

Thus, HDZ and SNSD will have 6 out of 9 judges in the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, giving them a supermajority to make the decisions they want, to change the Court's Rules as they wish, and ultimately to introduce entity voting into the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and turn this hitherto bastion of the state into a third chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

What an immeasurable tragedy that would be for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the end, everything is in the hands of the deputies in the House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who will very likely face a choice again on Thursday. First, whether the (in)competent commission of the House of Representatives will deny the deputies the right to perform their duties and all candidates the right to have their candidacies decided upon by the House of Representatives. Second, whether by voting for Vukoja, they will vote for a new chapter in the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina that does not bring complete catastrophe to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(M.T)