Alternative for Herceg Bosna

Why should the visible administration of Herceg Bosna live exclusively off the money of Croat men and women when the invisible administration of Herceg Bosna already lives off the money of everyone in BiH?

Making Herceg Bosna visible is not possible unless the work of all public institutions, companies, and organizations is transparent. Its visibility primarily implies the visibility of the way resources are exploited. Connecting everything that is named after it – as Dragan Čović says – means nothing more than the centralization of power. Making that management structure more visible is possible even without the consent of the Croat people throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, but only in the sense of bureaucratizing its existence. 

The president of the Croatian Democratic Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina has managed to mobilize the leaders of other parties that perceive themselves as political representatives of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina into a bloc that will be assigned the role of the parliament of the Croatian Community of Herceg Bosna. By gathering them under the umbrella of the vital national interest of the most majoritized people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he became the shadow prime minister of Herceg Bosna while he was the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today, the issue of Herceg Bosna's visibility is again topical because Dragan Čović, having lost the position of president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has freed himself from the burden of presiding over the state. And for another reason: to explain who and what Herceg Bosna is, i.e., the Croatian National Assembly. 

Speaking of the fetish of general suffrage, here is another example. Since Croatia joined the European Union, citizens of the city of Mostar who also hold its citizenship have had the opportunity to elect representatives to the European Parliament more times than local authorities. How influential they are at the European Parliament level is irrelevant, given that they at least have the opportunity to exercise their right to vote. Such a tyranny of elections is not imposed by Dragan Čović. However, the fact that he still holds a good portion of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina suggests that BiH can get to the European Union without Herceg Bosna just as much as the European Union can persuade him to hold elections in Mostar. 

By making Herceg Bosna a bureaucratic giant that neither European funds, nor the majoritized and disrespected Croat people, nor even RH and BiH will be able to sustain, Dragan Čović persistently tests the dimensions of the maneuver space that the Dayton Peace Agreement leaves for Herceg Bosna. The thesis is clear: if the Croat people think they are majoritized, they will only then learn how much they actually can be. In other words, if Croat men and women in Bosnia and Herzegovina take responsibility for financing such an administration of this and that existing Herceg Bosna, the third entity will pay for itself. If they cannot, then nothing – they will pay for it together with Serbs and Bosniaks, while also paying for what Herceg Bosna is not. This is not a second alternative to Herceg Bosna, but Bosnia and Herzegovina today. 

So what will it be – Peaceful Bosnia or restless Herceg Bosna? Dragan Čović decides most about that. Not because he knows that the electorate of Herceg Bosna is not fragile and weak, God forbid, not agile enough to elevate him to the Presidency, but because Dragan Čović believes that Herceg Bosna embodies him, while everyone else embodies Herceg Bosna. The European Union will not deny him this satisfaction, if for no other reason than because the only thing he can lose is those few thousand Croat men and women who did not want to flee Herceg Bosna to it. Hence, the alternative is to stop depending on it, on the companies that constitute it. 

Herceg Bosna can cease to exist only when it disappears from the public space, which will happen only when the people stand up for what belongs to them. It is desirable that this happens before Herceg Bosna has a police force like Republika Srpska. Making Herceg Bosna visible, ultimately, is nothing more than an introduction to a new form of repression – both cantonal and entity. This is the best way to divert the gaze of those who hold a Bosnian passport in one hand and a European Union passport in the other. At least for that part of Croat men and women whose home remains outside of the Herceg Bosna that Dragan Čović dreams of.