SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS Instead of comfortable meditation, the opposition must become a pro-Bosnian 'shadow government' and offer laws!

By: Rasim Belko

In a country like Bosnia and Herzegovina, any talk of acting in the shadow of the government is characterized by suspicion of legality and legitimacy. And in the political environment, the term 'shadow government' refers to an alternative government formed within the opposition, with a significant role for the intellectual mass and citizens.

Therefore, a serious opposition uses the 'shadow government' mechanism to correct all the shortcomings of the ruling majority with functional solutions that bring benefits to both the state and the citizens. And let me clarify, this is not about any conspiracy, because the 'shadow government' is considered a key component of democratic societies, as it allows the opposition to articulate its views, provide alternative visions, and hold the government accountable for its actions.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country where it is almost equally comfortable to be in power and in opposition, this mechanism has been completely bypassed, and its use could be leveraged to 'pull' the country out of the crisis. Because, it is evident that the project and experiment with the current government has failed, and the longer such a situation lasts, the more difficult it will be for the country to function.

It is also true that the opposition is stuck in some of its conflicts, so what we used to call pro-Bosnian politics, which could be a quality 'shadow government,' is now a distant prospect.

Therefore, a redefinition of relations within the opposition, and a reshuffling of roles and positions within the opposition itself, is necessary, which would allow for clear definition of goals, as well as the personnel who would take responsibility for the success of the 'shadow government'.

Considering that NES, DF, and Stranka za BiH are parliamentary parties at both the state and entity levels, there is no doubt that these parties, as a combination of the center and the center-left, could form the driving force of an opposition government that will offer solutions needed by this country to move towards a better future, not only in parliaments but also in public and in the international community.

The fact that some other combinations have not succeeded so far might actually be the right opportunity for these three parties to synchronize both their plans and personnel, and then offer programmatic action from the opposition to all who are willing.

Because, after all, it is clear that SDA cannot lead the 'shadow government' forces. The amount of evident party disobedience at lower levels of government and the party's unwillingness to fight disobedient elements for the sake of trust and the pro-Bosnian bloc has clearly distanced SDA from the role of the 'shadow government's' engine driver. However, even such an SDA could have a significant role if the aforementioned bloc of parties offers them political solutions as an agreement that they should implement together.

What is crucial for the success of the 'shadow government' is the trust of political forces in each other, as well as the trust of citizens in such forces. To build this, there must be a clear plan, with a visible measure of prosperity offered by the prepared solutions. In other words, the 'shadow government' is not a mechanism for party officials to get jobs, but it will offer solutions to both parties and the state that bring mutual benefit. The well-utilized power of the 'shadow government' is actually a path to good results in the upcoming election cycles.

After all, the 'shadow government' would consist of personnel from the parties that 'make it up,' and then it is up to these personnel to demonstrate the knowledge and political skill that should qualify them to one day sit in the state institutions.

The situation in which Bosnia and Herzegovina finds itself clearly cries out for concrete and quality solutions. Those imposed and projected to bring these solutions are clearly unable to do so, so instead of writing reactions, statements, laments, and political lawsuits, opposition forces at both the state and entity levels should utilize the democratic capacity of the shadow government.

At the state level, there is an evident crisis of trust among coalition partners, which has rendered the work of both the Council of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH meaningless. Imagine if the existing opposition, whose capacity is not small, had by now prepared and submitted 30 legal solutions for procedure: No matter how much the international community dislikes this opposition, things would ultimately be completely clear as to who is for a functional state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Therefore, instead of comfortable idleness and tearing apart the remaining part of the power cake in cantons and municipalities, Stranka za BiH, NES, and Demokratska fronta, with the epithet of pro-Bosnian, have a necessity to cooperate through a shadow government and an obligation to extend a hand to SDA for the sake of the country, but with clearly defined and initialed agreements.

Such action would undoubtedly elevate the aforementioned bloc above the political and institutional negligence into which Bosnia and Herzegovina has been pushed for the interests of hegemonic policies in the neighborhood and an international community that increasingly seems to be losing control.

Those who are ready in every way to defend Bosnia and Herzegovina also have the responsibility to show it through their actions, no matter how difficult the situation. Because, comparison with the imposed rulers who believe Milorad Dodik is the same as comparison with traitors.