BiH and EU police structures at Dodik's service: 'Fugitives' don't flee, but are escorted across the border by the Border Police

By: Amina Čorbo-Zećo

An alleged investigation into how and whether Milorad Dodik, Nenad Stevandić, and Radovan Višković crossed the state border has been ongoing for over a month. That they crossed is clear to everyone. How this was possible without a reaction from the competent institutions is something no one knows yet.

Not even a central warrant seriously hindered their movements, which further exposed the helplessness of the state system. Instead of questions of accountability within the BiH Border Police being raised, the public's focus has been shifted almost exclusively to the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA).

In the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, only a few voices, such as MP Jasmin Emrić and parts of the opposition from SDA, pointed to the role of the Director of the Border Police, Mirko Kuprešaković (HDZ). However, a request for his dismissal has never been formally processed. The Intelligence Security Agency (OSA) has also not escaped criticism, but it is only mentioned in passing, without real public and institutional pressure.

However, the topic of this text is not solely dysfunctional institutions; much has already been said and written about that. The core of the problem lies deeper in devastating political divisions and the fact that, despite the formal centralization of the BiH Border Police, the eastern part of the border is de facto controlled by policies from the Republika Srpska entity.

Responsibility for this situation cannot be attributed solely to the authorities in that entity; it lies with the entire political leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the freshest examples of institutional absurdity is the agreement with FRONTEX.

Unlike other countries in the region, where FRONTEX operates exclusively in cooperation with national border police, in BiH its personnel will be under the command of not only the BiH Border Police but also entity and cantonal police structures. This illogicality is reminiscent of the already seen compromise regarding cooperation with EUROPOL.

The agreement at the time, which even the EU supported for pragmatic reasons, just like this one with FRONTEX, stipulated that the EUROPOL Cooperation Unit would be located in the building on Trg BiH, outside the institution to which it naturally belongs, the Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies (DKPT). The result? Informal work, fragmented responsibility, and staff officially employed in other institutions, without a clearly defined status.

International partners, who expect a single point of cooperation for EUROPOL, INTERPOL, SELEC, and other security mechanisms, are rightly expressing concern. But their goal is one: to protect their borders, and they don't really care what happens within BiH. Therefore, it is extremely unserious to sign agreements detrimental to BiH's security for the sake of third countries' security. And all this under the guise of BiH's path to the European Union.

Because similar problems will inevitably await us in cooperation with FRONTEX. If the experience with EUROPOL shows anything, it is that compromises that break institutional responsibility do not bring functionality, but additional chaos.

Therefore, today we have a situation where the BiH Border Police does not perform basic tasks, SIPA ignores court orders, and high political officials like Dodik, Stevandić, and Višković freely cross borders, ignore laws, and actively work to dismantle the state.

Ultimately, the problem is not just with the institutions that do not work, but with the political system that allows them to do so and supports them as such!