CHAOTIC AND ILLEGAL Nešić Manipulates Cooperation with EUROPOL, National Contact Point Losing Its Purpose!

By: A. Čorbo-Zećo

The National Joint Contact Point of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Cooperation with EUROPOL is not functioning. To be precise, it is in chaos! In one sentence, everything functioned much better before the full cooperation with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) was established!

This was to be expected, as the Constitution and laws of BiH were derogated on the path to establishing the contact point, and concessions were made to the demands of representatives of Republika Srpska, so the Ministry of Security of BiH was chosen as the seat of the contact point, instead of the Directorate for the Coordination of Police Bodies, even though according to EU guidelines, all channels for international information exchange (INTERPOL, EUROPOL, SELEC, police liaison officer) must be located in one place.

It is now completely clear that one of the goals of moving the contact point from the Directorate for the Coordination of Police Bodies and incompletely regulating its work was to create confusion and facilitate unauthorized access to information by certain political options in BiH.

The regulations currently governing the work of the contact point and cooperation with EUROPOL are incomplete and contradictory, and are interpreted and applied differently. According to well-informed sources of Patria, the Minister of Security of BiH, Nenad Nešić, calls the shots, even though he has no operational authority and should not interfere in the work of the Contact Point.

Nešić does this with the help of Danijel Maunaga, Deputy Coordinator of the BiH National Contact Point for Cooperation with EUROPOL, who is the boss of everyone, including Irena Marelja, who is nominally considered the head of the Contact Point for Cooperation with EUROPOL, but is factually very far from it.

Due to the failure to take appropriate measures in accordance with the current situation in the Contact Point and in accordance with the coordinator's obligations and responsibilities, it could even be linked to the committed criminal offense of abuse of position and negligent work in service. This will certainly be discussed on March 12, when a meeting of all bodies participating in the Contact Point is scheduled.

In the meantime, Nešić has requested that they do not communicate or exchange correspondence among themselves (16 bodies)!? With what right Nešić is doing this will certainly be known after March 12.

Certainly, the Head of the EU Delegation and Special Representative of the EU in BiH, Johann Sattler, will have to explain to both the citizens of BiH and the representatives of EUROPOL why the security of the EUROPOL protected communication network – SIENA and the data exchanged through this network are questionable, while activities are underway to extend this network to lower levels in BiH, to entity Ministries of Internal Affairs and other bodies!?

Simply put, everything was done to exclude the Directorate for the Coordination of Police Bodies (DKPT) as much as possible from the work of the Contact Point, directly by Maunaga, even though Directorate officials contributed the most to its work in the initial phase, as they logically have the most experience.

And the formation of this Contact Point was the formation of something that already exists within the Directorate and is regulated by law. But the jurisdiction of the DKPT was simply wanted to be taken away and a national contact point established for political reasons, not professional standards! And that is one of the main problems.

To be clear, the Contact Point was established and tasks were taken over without regulating its status and adequate mode of operation, which created a chaotic situation and problems.

Thus, within the Contact Point for BiH, SEE JAD is managed – one of the most demanding and extensive operational actions for Southeast Europe. This action has been successfully led by a Directorate official for a long time, but Maunaga believes that this action should be excluded from Directorate officials at all costs, and activities have already been initiated in this regard.

Therefore, it will be necessary to answer the question whether the reason for this is the data from the SKY and ANOM applications that are coming to BiH, but not all agencies in BiH receive them, but Nešić and Maunaga decide who gets what. Of course, most of the data is directed towards the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RS!?

Translated, it cannot be said that the protected communication channel SIENA and the data exchanged are in safe hands.

“They have gone a step further, and soon, upon requests from entity Ministries of Internal Affairs, SIENA communication will be requested, and most likely extended, to lower levels. Given the political situation and the goals of political options in BiH, it can be assumed that certain agencies, after extending the SIENA channel to lower levels, will consciously bypass communication through the single contact point, so the Contact Point will lose the purpose for which it was established,” says Patria’s source.

It is important to note that the National Contact Point does not have its own employees, nor is it clear when this issue will be resolved.

As Patria’s source reveals, officials are being brought in based on friendship or ethnic affiliation, and the Service for Foreigners' Affairs (which revoked the Directorate's power of attorney to represent them) appointed a state, not a police, official (!?), which is absolutely not in accordance with the Rulebook, given the sensitive data and the degree of secrecy with which they operate.

The National Point does not have its own seal, nor is the method of signing documents regulated, which Maunaga strongly opposes. All of this is necessary for the functioning of the Contact Point. Therefore, a large number of documents are not signed, which can also cause legal consequences if the Contact Point documents were to be used in criminal or other proceedings.

To be continued...