Two Denises and One Jens: How BiH Officials Embarrassed the Country

By Haris Imamović

At the end of May 2022, I was in Brussels at a meeting between NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the then-Chairman of the BiH Presidency, Šefik Džaferović (as his advisor). I will not recount the content of the conversation. I can only say that it was one of the most substantive meetings I attended during my four years in the Presidency.

Stoltenberg did not waste time reciting platitudes about the relationship between NATO and BiH, but spoke about concrete aspects of that relationship, even going into detail. Understandably, his meticulousness actually reflected the valuable work of his team, who prepared the meeting well for him. My impression was that the main role in this regard, along with the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo, was played by Javier Colomina, Stoltenberg's associate who had visited Sarajevo ten days before our trip to Brussels and familiarized himself with the situation on the ground.

After the meeting, we walked through the impressive hall of the NATO building. As is customary, during such breaks between two serious activities, the conversation flowed in less somber tones. Among other things, I remember Stoltenberg talking about how he first visited Sarajevo in the 1960s. (His father was then working as a diplomat at the Norwegian Embassy in Yugoslavia.) The NATO Secretary General, who was still a boy at the time, particularly remembered one of Sarajevo's pastry shops. I think it was "Egipat", but I'm not sure.

After the walk, a press conference was held, at which Stoltenberg said that NATO remains committed to the "Euro-Atlantic aspirations of BiH," etc. In addition to the usual talking points, Stoltenberg also announced a support package for BiH's defense capabilities. (It was later revealed that this involved a transfer of 54 million euros, the largest part of which was directed towards the Light Infantry Battalion Group, which numbers 840 BiH soldiers.) Stoltenberg also added that the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo would hire new staff and that its budget would be increased.

To be clear, I do not consider any of this to be a result of our visit, but rather a reaction from NATO after a longer process of assessing the situation in BiH, including previous discussions with our cabinet.

At the press conference, Džaferović, speaking about BiH's strategic commitment, said the same as Stoltenberg: that Bosnia and Herzegovina is an aspiring country ("one who strives for something; a candidate"), and recalled the laws and decisions of BiH institutions that define membership in NATO as BiH's goal. In response to journalists' questions about messages of "peaceful secession of RS," Džaferović replied that "there can be no secession, especially not a peaceful one."

When asked by a journalist if he was aware of the tensions in BiH, Stoltenberg said that NATO is aware of the inflammatory rhetoric in BiH, especially that coming from Republika Srpska, and that in this regard, it provides practical support to the Armed Forces of BiH through the aforementioned package.

It should not be forgotten that all of this was said in the context of the aggression against Ukraine, i.e., the fact that NATO member states came to the aid of the attacked Kyiv, sending weapons and other forms of assistance.

Given the above, the authorities of Republika Srpska had enough reason to conclude from Stoltenberg's message that, in the event of a conflict in BiH, NATO could similarly support the central authorities in Sarajevo. That possibility alone is significant as a deterrent mechanism for the RS authorities against secessionist aspirations. "Our goal is to prevent new instability, a new war," Stoltenberg said.

I say all this to illustrate two norms in the Alliance's diplomatic communication. First, anything NATO intends to do in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be announced by NATO itself. Second, at press conferences of BiH officials with the NATO Secretary General, agreed-upon positions are presented, especially when it comes to strategic issues such as BiH's status on the NATO path. Because any public disagreement on these issues between BiH officials and the NATO Secretary General at a joint press conference can only be a symptom of a worrying collision, as BiH and NATO do not belong to the same order of magnitude.

In the past few days, there have been serious deviations from these norms.

At a recently held press conference at NATO headquarters with Stoltenberg, the current Chairman of the BiH Presidency, Denis Bećirović, said something that significantly deviated from the Alliance leader's talking points. "I want to point out that all formal conditions have been met for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be invited to join NATO," Bećirović said.

Responding to a journalist's question ("Will BiH join NATO?"), which was clearly prompted by the aforementioned statement, Stoltenberg denied the current Chairman of the BiH Presidency. He did so, of course, indirectly, but quite clearly. He said that Bosnia and Herzegovina has two conditions. The first is that BiH implements the necessary reforms that strengthen institutions. The second condition is that the membership in NATO is desired by "the people of BiH and the authorities in BiH." That is, a formal and political condition.

Unlike Bećirović, who shifted the focus to NATO, saying he expects the Alliance to invite our country to join, Stoltenberg shifted the focus to BiH and said: "It is not up to me to decide [whether BiH will join NATO], but up to BiH." Although he did not clarify how BiH should decide whether to join NATO or not, it is unequivocally concluded from Stoltenberg's words that it has not decided. Because why should it "decide" if it has already decided (as Bećirović stated in the rest of his presentation)?

I don't know what Bećirović intended to achieve with his thoughtless appearance, but it is clear what he achieved.

In the first reaction to the aforementioned very unpleasant situation, I wrote on the social network X: "I can't believe Denis Bećirović did this. He literally forced Stoltenberg to say that BiH cannot become a NATO member without new decisions from BiH institutions, which must be approved by Serb representatives." (This observation of mine was, by the way, retweeted by Reuters' national security correspondent at the White House.)

To avoid things being entirely bleak, it should be noted that Stoltenberg also said that "BiH has the status of a country that has an Action Plan for Membership, and the purpose of the Action Plan for Membership is to make BiH a NATO member." Also, Bećirović, in his presentation, said: "We have also achieved concrete results in recent years. Among other things, I will mention the following: we have adopted three ANPs which were sent to Brussels, after which NATO officially confirmed that the Action Plan for Membership has been activated."

Bećirović, for understandable reasons – namely, he was speaking on behalf of the state, not in his own name – did not explain that the aforementioned three documents were adopted by the previous government, after a difficult struggle with Milorad Dodik. He could not say that at that point (it would have been superfluous), but I can say it here (because it is not superfluous here).

Just as I can remind that Bećirović himself once belittled Džaferović's and Komšić's conditioning of the appointment of the Council of Ministers with the sending of the ANP.

Namely, when he voted for the appointment of Borjana Krišto as the new designate, Bećirović said: "In the previous convocation, the designate was chosen 14 months after the elections. In this mandate, as you can see, in less than a month. This is a positive message. This is a message that bad practice from previous mandates should be changed."

Therefore, Komšić's and Džaferović's practice (of conditioning) was bad, even though it resulted in the sending of the ANP, and Bećirović's action to do the opposite is good, even though it did not enable the sending of any ANP.

When Stoltenberg said that the (formal) condition for BiH's membership is reforms, he certainly meant the adoption and sending of the ANP, which is missing. Bećirović should explain why it is missing.

Besides the aforementioned debate (or, rather, almost a debate about whether we have met all the conditions for membership, or whether NATO should invite us to become members, or whether we should express our will), another deviation from the norms was made by Denis Zvizdić, a member of the Collegium of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH.

First, after Bećirović's meeting with Stoltenberg, the news with a pompous headline appeared in the media: NATO is sending troops to BiH! "A battalion of NATO reserve forces will be deployed in BiH," the news stated. "As we were told, this is one of the results of the meeting between the Chairman of the BiH Presidency and the NATO Secretary General."

Given how the news was presented, I am almost certain that the anonymous source in this case is the cabinet of Denis Bećirović: it is obvious that the primary motive for disseminating this information is to exaggerate the significance of the visit of the Chairman of the Presidency to NATO headquarters.

Shortly thereafter, Zvizdić spoke out and "officially" announced on his X account that "NATO is sending a battalion of reserve forces to BiH."

After a period of confusion, Zvizdić was denied by Defense Minister Zukan Helez, Presidency member Željko Komšić, and EUFOR itself, who clarified that EUFOR reserve forces had arrived, not NATO. Finally, Denis Bećirović himself, whose cabinet (I repeat) is the most likely source of this disinformation, also criticized him.

"I would suggest to officials who are fighting for BiH to make fewer statements and announcements, and to work more seriously behind the scenes," Bećirović said (not, of course, about his lavishly thoughtless statement that "all formal conditions have been met for BiH to be invited to join NATO," but about Zvizdić's thoughtless status).

Basic logic dictates the following: if NATO had decided to deploy its forces, the NATO Secretary General himself would have announced it first. It sounds like a completely nonsensical fantasy that Denis Zvizdić, whose institutional capacity is on par with that of a hall manager in the "Egipat" pastry shop, would announce such a decision.

If anything shows that BiH must work on "strengthening the capacity of its democratic institutions" (Stoltenberg), then it is this somewhat comical, and to some extent completely tragic, performance we have witnessed in recent days.

(Istraga.ba)