Bihać was not saved, Bihać saved itself: Owen also recorded, oil from Split went to attacks on the Fifth Corps!

By: Amina Čorbo-Zećo

When Andrej Plenković, Prime Minister of Croatia, states that Operation "Storm" prevented a new tragedy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, then the counter-question must be asked: was Bihać saved by "Storm" – or was Bihać actually a shield for years, exhausting Serbian forces and thus facilitating the path for "Storm"?

Journalist Sead Omeragić, one of the few who dares to publicly demystify narratives that have been recycled for years as "official truths," reminds us of this essentially important fact. His thesis is clear: 'The Bihać Krajina was the one that bled, resisted, and kept huge Serbian forces under pressure, while Croatia, at the same time, at best strategized, and often traded'.

"Throughout the war, the Serbs exhausted themselves attacking the Bihać Krajina. Sometimes they suffered terrible losses, experienced serious defeats from the Fifth Corps of the Army of RBiH," Omeragić tells Patria, recalling that the Fifth Corps even advanced 40 kilometers into the SAO Krajina territory, controlled large areas, captured huge quantities of weapons – all while the international community was preoccupied with maps and "neutral" reports.

And then comes the key point of revelation: while the narrative about Bihać being endangered and how "Storm" was crucial to saving it was being pushed, fuel tankers were arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia. These are not claims but facts, even recorded in the notes of peace negotiator David Owen.

"In early 1995, fuel from Split and Zadar reached the army of Bosnian Serbs, through the Krajina corridor, with the complicity of Croats," Omeragić points out.
And all this just four months before "Storm".

So, who exactly was "Storm" intended for? And who was Croatia actually saving?

"Dayton negotiator, Dr. Ivo Komšić, once openly stated that the towns of Grahovo, Glamoč, and Drvar – which were presented as HVO military trophies in the summer of 1995 – were actually handed over by agreement. Handed over as a political concession, perhaps as compensation for previously lost territories like Bosnian Posavina, which, according to numerous sources, Tuđman "gifted" to Milošević without much hesitation," Omeragić points out.

And it was precisely these towns, only formally liberated before "Storm," that created a buffer zone towards Bihać, and prepared the stage for the military intervention that is glorified today as a "salvation."

Perhaps Bihać would have been saved, not because of the Fifth Corps, but because of their exhaustion on other fronts. Because, while Bihać was being defended, Zagreb and Belgrade were trading, and the international community was balancing between "two sides" that were never truly equal.

Perhaps it is time for history to be written with facts, not political needs. And the facts clearly state that Bihać was not saved, Bihać saved itself.