First Testimony on the "Pretis" Operation: My Longest Sarajevo Night

By: Azem Dervišević Zenga

The long-planned aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina entered its final phase of realization, and the military formations of the Serb Democratic Party, supported by the JNA and volunteers from Serbia, had already begun their bloody campaign in many BiH cities. Late in the afternoon of April 17, 1992, I arrived at the Patriotic League Headquarters codenamed "Slastičarna". The headquarters was located in Bjelave, and that day, Zaim Backović, Mustafa Hajrulahović-Talijan, Sefer Halilović, Zijad Rašidagić, Sulejman Vranj, and several others whose names I don't remember were there.

That day, we had fighting near the Hotel Bristol. A group of fighters led by Dževad Topić participated in that battle, along with a team from Kerim Lučarević's unit, led by Sulejman Babić Memko.

The Patriotic League headquarters received a report that a column of military vehicles of the former JNA was moving towards the factory in Vogošća, likely to occupy and take control of the factory. "Pretis" housed enormous military material reserves, especially explosives.

Just three days earlier, on April 14, the JNA, with the help of armed SDS formations, had removed all weapons from the Faletići Territorial Defense warehouse. It could be assumed that the same was being prepared for "Pretis". That evening, visibility was very poor, and spring rain had just begun to fall, so I suggested to those present at the Headquarters that we organize and raid "Pretis" before the JNA column arrived, to retrieve everything from the factory that could serve us in the defense of Sarajevo.

It was not realistic to attempt to capture the entire factory and keep it under control. It was in a large open area, in a populated place, completely surrounded by well-armed SDS units.

The idea was approved by the aforementioned commanders, and after consultations, a decision was made to carry out this operation, with me, Azem Dervišević, as the commander of the operation.

I was told to go to the Police Hall, where the MUP Special Unit was stationed. The liaison between the PL Headquarters and the Special Police was Asim Dautbašić, whom I met privately. I informed him of the objective of the planned operation and told him that we were counting on the support and active participation of the MUP Special Unit in this operation. Asim Dautbašić promised to inform the commander Dragan Vikić and convey the details of the planned action, after which a decision would be made on the participation of a part of the MUP Special Unit of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After everything, I was informed that, after all, an reinforced platoon of the MUP Special Unit would participate in the planned action. The assembly point, agreed upon for that evening, was Kobilja Glava at 11 PM.

After the conversation with Asim Dautbašić, I went to Dževad Topić at his base near the Hotel "Beograd" and informed him about the operation plan. I had already had several joint operations with Topa's group, through which we had established excellent friendly relations and mutual trust, which was very important in those early days of the war. Topa agreed without hesitation to come with his group.

While I was carrying out these tasks, members of the Patriotic League Headquarters were mobilizing additional units for this action. The first commander of the TO BiH, Colonel Hasan Efendić, was informed about this. At that time, the TO BiH and the PL Headquarters were separate, but there was close cooperation between them, and there was also a previously made decision by the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina based on which all patriotic units were incorporated into the TO BiH.

I arrived at Kobilja Glava around 10 PM, where members of the Special Unit were already present, led by Kemal Ademović, and in the meantime, the large hall of the Cultural Center began to fill up. More than a hundred armed resistance fighters arrived. After 10-15 minutes, the TO commander, Colonel Hasan Efendić, introduced me to those present as the commander of this operation. We knew that "Pretis" contained huge quantities of shells and rockets, but we were primarily interested in the basic and supplementary charges for mortar shells, rockets, and anti-tank combat equipment, the so-called "wasps and zoljas".

After I began to explain the objective to those present, about 70% of the armed resistance fighters left the room, judging the action to be too risky, even impossible to carry out.

After half an hour, about 50-60 armed fighters remained. The MUP Special Unit platoon with Kemo Ademović, Dževad Topić with his group, the late Dževad Begić, known as Đilda, several soldiers under the command of Nusret Dedo Šišić, and several reserve police officers from the Centar and Stari Grad municipalities. The willingness of reserve police officer Irfan Mravović, who worked at "Pretis", to go with us was very important, as he knew which warehouses contained the "wasps" and mortar shells. Most of the participants in this action were completely unfamiliar with the terrain, and his information was invaluable to us, especially regarding the appearance and surroundings of the gate through which we had to forcibly enter the facility.

Once again, I asked the group commanders if they would participate in this operation. The special forces confirmed, and Đilda, in his style, said he would go, "even if only he and I go to Pretis alone."

Topa confirmed, and some smaller groups also confirmed their willingness to participate. I listened to the useful information from those present, determined the numbers, and set the following plan for the raid on "Pretis":

- One group will remain on the road towards Vogošća to stop potential intervention by SDS formations or the expected JNA column from the direction of Vogošća, while the rest will proceed towards the cargo gate. After securing the cargo gate, a small group will remain to guard the gate while the rest of the fighters, led by Kemal Ademović and myself, enter "Pretis" to the warehouses where the materials we wanted to retrieve are located.

Given that the guards at "Pretis" were expecting a JNA military unit that was likely to occupy the factory complex, and due to the poor visibility, which was a godsend for us at that moment, we decided to use the Special Unit's vehicles, sending them ahead with flashing lights to make the guards think it was military police. When we approached the gate, the plan was to forcibly seize the gate, without shooting and as quietly as possible.

We all knew that the task was very dangerous and that it largely depended on speed, but also on the secrecy of our actions. All participants in the action were very disciplined and adhered to the agreed plan of action.

We stopped briefly in front of the cargo gate, after which Đilda and the late Vinko Šamarlić jumped out of the car with lightning speed and disarmed the guards in a few seconds.

After securing the cargo gate, we moved on, leaving a group of fighters to secure the gate and our retreat route in case things went wrong, and if we were discovered and attacked. As we began to move towards the warehouses by vehicle, I was astonished at how far they were from the cargo gate, and at that moment they seemed even farther than they actually were. That night, everything seemed longer and more distant to us. We reached the warehouse where we thought the "wasps" and mortar shells were, but in that warehouse, we found rockets for which we had no launchers. That was not what we needed. We moved towards another warehouse and fortunately found the materials we were looking for. I tried to inform Colonel Efendić via encrypted radio that we had successfully entered "Pretis" and found what we came for, but due to the distance and the valley we were in at that moment, I lost the connection.

I drove back a few hundred meters towards the cargo gate and managed to establish contact with Colonel Efendić, and asked him to send additional vehicles and personnel as soon as possible to retrieve more equipment.

We planned to empty as many warehouses as possible under the cover of darkness and leave the factory before dawn. The vehicles we arrived in were already so loaded that we feared exceeding their load capacity, as the shock absorbers were quite strained. Time passed, and the additional vehicles requested from Colonel Efendić had not yet arrived. We waited for hours, and then sometime before dawn, as it began to get light, Kemal Ademović told me that it was too risky to be in the factory complex and that we should conclude this operation. I agreed with him, and we began to leave "Pretis".

When we reached the gate, at the moment I was waiting for all the participants of the action to leave the factory premises and as our last vehicles were exiting, it began to dawn, and then suddenly the vehicles with personnel I had requested from Colonel Hasan Efendić hours earlier appeared.

I stopped the column and said that the operation was over and that all groups, including those deployed as a fallback, had already headed towards the city. However, the newly arrived defenders wanted to go to the warehouses, wanting to retrieve more explosives. Unfortunately, instead of firmly opposing them at that moment, regret for all the weapons left in the warehouses prevailed in me as well. And as the last fighters from the first group were leaving for Kobilja Glava, I sat next to the driver in an FAP-13 truck, which was at the head of the column, and together with the other arriving fighters, I set off through the gate towards the warehouses.

When we had gone about a hundred meters from the cargo gate, a well-organized and armed enemy ambush met us on our right side, and they opened fierce fire on our column with infantry and anti-tank weapons. The glass in the truck's cabin began to shatter as bullets came from our right. The truck did not stop. I started shouting at the driver to stop the truck, but when I looked at him more closely, I saw that he showed no signs of life. His lifeless body fell over the steering wheel, and his leg remained stiff on the gas pedal as the truck sped into the "Pretis" factory facilities. I somehow managed to move the young man's leg off the gas pedal and pressed the brake with my left foot, and then jumped out of the truck. I sought cover and lay down in a ditch by the road and looked around. I saw a terrible sight: Our fighters lay dead, bodies hung over the sides of the trucks, while calls and moans of the wounded could be heard. Among the wounded, I recognized Suad Hodović Hopa, a member of the Hotel Zagreb detachment, a unit of which I was the direct commander, as well as Salih Džić, my deputy. Salih and I gathered the wounded fighters and began to evacuate them, while the SDS units continued to engage us with fierce infantry fire and called on us to surrender.

Most of our vehicles were not far from the cargo gate, and some of our soldiers, thinking they were in a hopeless situation, decided to surrender. We continued with the evacuation, and then we came across a larger number of parked Golfs. Salih, by connecting wires, started a vehicle without a key, and the five of us managed to get out of "Pretis".

As we were heading back, immense sadness mixed with despair overwhelmed me. Images of our dead fighters flashed before my eyes. I felt terribly heavy. At that moment, the initial success was irrelevant to me. All I could think about was that the dead and wounded were left in "Pretis" at the mercy of the enemy. I knew that the special forces had two armored vehicles, and with them, we might be able to return and retrieve the bodies of our fallen and wounded comrades. I called the Special Unit base and told them what had happened during the second attempt to enter "Pretis" and requested two armored vehicles. I don't remember who suggested bringing ambulances with us, after which we set off again towards "Pretis" in the Special Unit vehicles commanded by Vehid Ušanović.

It was already 9 AM. Since I served in an anti-tank unit, training for anti-tank combat, I knew how vulnerable armored combat vehicles were, so I felt more comfortable in the role of someone who "hunts" them than in the role of someone riding in them. This time, together with my comrades, I could be easy prey for the unbridled enemy who was still waiting in ambushes around the "Pretis" factory for JNA units to arrive and take control. When we approached the factory gate, we called out to the local SDS formations via megaphone not to shoot, saying that we had only come to retrieve the bodies of our fallen comrades and that we would not open fire on their positions.

I think that bringing the Special Unit police armored vehicle and using the megaphone had a strong psychological effect on the enemy, so they did not open fire on us while we were retrieving the dead and wounded comrades from the "Pretis" factory. Only after this third entry into "Pretis", after that long night from April 17 to 18, extremely exhausted, I returned to my home base located in the Hotel Zagreb around noon.

When I woke up late at night on April 18, I went to the Police Hall, and then to the Patriotic League command, and learned that we had retrieved about 800 anti-tank charges and over 1,000 mortar shells. On April 18, we could not have imagined that the equipment seized in "Pretis" would be one of the decisive factors for the defense of the city on May 2, 1992, a day that director Avdo Huseinović called "Bosnia or Death" in his documentary film. Unfortunately, in the "Pretis" operation, we lost 6 fighters, 20 were wounded, and 7 were captured.

Dževad Begić Đilda and Vinko Šamarlić, well-known Bosnian heroes, were crucial that evening as well. Đilda often used to say: "If one has to die, let it not be from a sniper. Let it be a man's death." He was 25 years old when he lost his life to a sniper's bullet while helping a wounded woman in Pofalići. In June 1992, Vinko Šamarlić also laid down his life in defense of the homeland. As an excellent athlete, he did not live to participate in the Olympic Games in Barcelona that year, although he had met the qualifying standard. The defense of the city and country was more important to him. 20 years after the "Pretis" operation, I learned that another group of fighters under the command of Safet Hadžić, during the second attempt to enter "Pretis", unaware of the exact operation plan and the use of the cargo gate, tried to enter through the main gate, where Safet Hadžić and his group of fighters lost their lives.

The Special Police Unit "Bosna" is certainly most responsible for the success of this operation. Without their participation, I claim that there were slim chances that this operation would have been carried out at all, and it would have been very difficult for it to be successful. The stories circulating that the operation was planned the night before in the premises of the Police Hall are incorrect.

The fact is that the exact plan for carrying out the operation was made and agreed upon in the Cultural Center at Kobilja Glava, only an hour or two before the operation was carried out, and I believe that this is one of the key reasons why the first raid on "Pretis" was successful. On the 21st anniversary of the "Pretis" operation, in April 2013, General Sulejman Vranj brought me a man. It turned out that this man was the driver of the FAP-13 truck. The one I thought was dead and whose body I was forced to remove from the truck. It was a miracle how he survived. The operation showed the unprecedented heroism of Bosnian patriots. I am proud of my participation in this operation, as well as of all my comrades, without whom we would have had difficulty defending the capital city of Sarajevo and the country of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time.