Karadžić sold Croatian Serb Krajinas to Tuđman for a dozen oil tankers

By: Sead Omeragić

What was Radovan Karadžić's role in the wartime sale of SAO Krajinas in Croatia? While Milorad Dodik prepares to celebrate January 9th, lesser-known details about Karadžić, the criminal and trader of human destinies and territories, should be revealed. What kind of Serb nation-builder he was can be seen from the details of his betrayal of SAO Krajinas in Croatia, and several secret agreements with Franjo Tuđman and the Government of the Republic of Croatia.

For those who know the background of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is not difficult to understand the current loyal friendship between Dragan Čović and Milorad Dodik and their actions for ethnically pure territories in BiH. Even before the war, UDBA officials claimed they always had all the details of private conversations involving Karadžić. Everything indicated that the intelligence community was behind him. He was suspected of working for KOS. As a doctor, he received a favorable specialization in the West, had inexplicable privileges at his workplace, and was among the first to practice privately. When he robbed the company Građenje, he was acquitted without any problems. An invisible hand guided and saved him.

Vitaly Churkin, the current Russian ambassador to the UN, was biasedly involved in the war against Bosnia and Herzegovina. David Owen writes in his memoirs that in 1993, Kozirev and Churkin told him and Cyrus Vance that they were "too convinced of the possibility that the Serbs would stand up for their sacred cows – Kosovo and Krajina." Thus, the Russians had no doubts that the Serbs cared more about Kosovo and Krajinas in Croatia. Milan Babić, an official of Republika Srpska Krajina, knew most about these facts. He committed suicide after everything, although it was always speculated that it was a liquidation. Milan Babić opposed getting closer to Karadžić because he considered him a liar and a turncoat. However, he had to go to Pale. On one occasion, when he was begging Aleksa Buha, the so-called Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Serbian Republic, for some help, Buha snapped at him not to ask for the impossible, because Tuđman was offering them six percent more territory in Bosnia if they gave up Krajina. This meant that Bosnia had already been divided between Serb and Croat fascism.

Back in February 1991, Borisav Jović clearly told Stipe Mesić: "The Croats can do whatever they want with the Serbs in Croatia, as far as we are concerned. They can impale them." Three years later, in April 1994, Feral Tribune would record that Jović called the Serbs of Krajina "those damned Serbs." Unfortunately, Karadžić sold Knin Krajina for ordinary oil tankers and minor Croatian aid in food for the population of RS. During 1995, a few months before the military operation "Oluja" began, Tuđman increased oil shipments to Karadžić. Two oil convoys, one from Split and the other from Zadar, headed towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The convoy from Split went down to Dretelj near Čapljina, where there were underground oil storage facilities, and then the rest continued towards Berkovići and Kalinovik. The convoy of tankers from Zadar passed through the territory of SAO Krajina and entered directly into Banja Luka. UN military observers meticulously followed all convoys. According to them, this oil was a gift to the Serbs for helping the HVO soldiers and refugees after their defeat by the Army of RBiH. Karadžić and Nikola Koljević confirmed the agreements between Bosnian Serbs and Croats regarding the fate of Krajinas quite openly to Adil Zulfikarpašić on July 17, 1991. Even then, these two leaders of Bosnian Serbs spoke of SAO Krajinas as a possible territory for trade at the expense of territories in BiH.

Babić recorded in his memoirs that Karadžić used the Krajinas in Croatia "only to strengthen the negotiating position of Republika Srpska in the Bosnian vortex." As early as November 1991, Karadžić informed Milošević that he was cooperating excellently with Boban. The first meeting between Boban and Karadžić was in July 1991 in Mostar. In a conversation with Milošević in the autumn of 1992, Karadžić showed his authority over the Krajinas: "I am dissatisfied with Babić, I intend to replace him, and I have a very high-quality replacement ready."

In September 1994, Hrvoje Šarinić wrote about Karadžić's proposals to Tuđman: "Bosnian Serbs are ready to give up Knin, although they have threatened to unite with it until now." Šarinić writes that a Serb businessman from Vienna was a frequent link for his contacts with Karadžić. That September 1994, the "businessman" proposed a "gentleman's agreement between Tuđman and Karadžić" to Šarinić. According to the agreement, Karadžić would "prevent the unification of RS and RSK, and in return, Croatia should economically support Republika Srpska and contribute to its political de-blockade."

Božidar Vučurević, one of the SDS leaders, confirmed: "As far as I know, there is a gentleman's agreement between Tuđman, Milošević, and Karadžić to exchange territory." What is gentlemanly about the ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks is known only to Vučurević. Milan Babić said in an interview for the Belgrade NIN, shortly after the war, that the Second Corps of the Army of RS lost positions in Kupres, Glamoč, Dinara, and Grahovo without any fighting. Babić reveals: "The loss of these positions and the surrounding of Knin by Croatia happened simultaneously with the negotiations between Republika Srpska and Croatia regarding the division of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Let me mention only the most famous negotiations, which alternated between Davor and Srbac."

There is much evidence that Grahovo, Glamoč, and Drvar, captured in the much-praised HVO offensive before the "Oluja" operation, were actually just handed over in exchange for Posavina. As early as 1991, Tuđman and Milošević agreed to open representative offices in Belgrade and Zagreb. Thus, it was decided that the Yugoslav representative office would be opened in Mesić Street in Šalata, and the Croatian one in Čakorska Street in Dedinje. At the same time, the Army of RBiH was fighting bloody battles against Karadžić's Chetniks and the HVO, while the latter did not fire a single shot at each other. In Pržine near Bosansko Grahovo, on January 29, 1995, the prime ministers of the para-states Herceg-Bosna and RS, Jadranko Prlić and Vladimir Lukić, met and agreed to open consular representative offices. There were no conflicts between the Army of RS and the HVO in BiH from the beginning of the war. Except for the long-ago, agreed-upon withdrawal around Dubrovnik. Only the HVO brigade near Brčko was somewhat with the soldiers of the Army of RBiH, but even that was approved from Zagreb due to the strategic importance of controlling the corridor towards Banja Luka and the Krajinas.

Hrvoje Šarinić, Tuđman's chief of staff, described Karadžić as an arrogant man and "a greater Serb than Slobodan Milošević." Šarinić quotes his statement, thereby only confirming the complete military unity of the HVO and Karadžić's and Mladić's armies: "Muslims are attacking Žepče with seven brigades, and if we didn't help the Croats, Žepče, Kiseljak, and Kreševo would have fallen." The details of this military cooperation were agreed upon in Njivice near Herceg Novi between the delegations of the HVO and the Army of RS. Božidar Vučurević testifies: "From the Croatian side were Boban, Prlić, and General Ante Roso, from the Serbian side Karadžić, Krajišnik, Koljević, and Generals Mladić, Gvero, and Milovanović. Many important political and military issues were discussed, including military aid from the Army of Republika Srpska to the Croats in the conflict with the Muslims. Some of this was realized in the areas of Žepče, Mostar, and Brčko."

After the failed attempt by the HVO to capture Travnik, the Army of RS accepted civilians and fighters of the HVO in Vlašić. At a meeting of Serb-Croat delegations in Čelebići near Bosansko Grahovo, Jadranko Prlić thanked "the people of Republika Srpska for helping the Croatian civilians and Croatian fighters" in front of the cameras. Serb shells fell on Travnik and Zenica for days in retaliation for the attack on their allies. To hide his negotiations and dealings with Tuđman, Karadžić wrote an open letter to Milošević accusing him of betraying Krajina. But even ordinary people in Krajina knew about Karadžić's betrayal and the sale of those SAO regions.

Ivan Zvonimir Čičak said in an interview for Feral: "The organized departure of Serbs began a few days before the 'Oluja' operation. Before the start of 'Oluja', organized evacuations began from all cities in Knin Krajina." When the Croats liberated Slavonia on May 2nd, Owen wrote: "The Croats won. The absence of a reaction from the Bosnian Serbs in Banja Luka was mysterious. They were the dog that did not bark that night." Owen recalled "Tuđman's enthusiasm, a few months earlier, when he told him about Karadžić's private map, which he had proposed to his government, and which gave large parts of Krajina to the Croats." Hrvoje Šarinić went to Milošević and chatted about unimportant things. A year earlier, he told Šarinić that he would replace Karadžić, but he could no longer do so. On the other hand, Tuđman and Karadžić communicated and agreed on everything concerning BiH and Krajinas. Karadžić increased his own price through direct communication and negotiations with Tuđman. While Slavonia and SAO Krajinas were falling, Karadžić shelled Sarajevo, Bihać, and the corridor near Brčko and Odžak. From all this, it is evident that RS was created not only through genocide against Bosniaks but also by sacrificing the Serbs of Krajina. It was an unprecedented mix of crime and trade in human lives and territory in history.