One of the Most Complicated Wars in History: Who is Who and Who is Fighting Whom in Northern Syria?

Written by: Jahja Muhasilović / Istraga.ba

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the war in Syria, which with brief ceasefires has lasted nearly a decade and a half, is the most complex modern conflict. The dynamics shaking the northern part of the country illustrate all the complexities of this conflict. After a somewhat longer pause, with occasional limited conflicts since COVID-19 and the Russian-Turkish agreement from March 2020 largely froze larger operations, the conflicts intensified again three days ago.

Why did the conflict happen just now?

The argument that the alliance of several militias (collectively called the “Syrian opposition”) uses to launch the conflict is that Damascus (the Assad regime) and its allies, indirectly Russia and Iran, did not adhere to the agreement reached in the Astana peace process. On several occasions, the initially agreed terms were revised, because each time Assad's troops violated what Iran, Turkey, and Iran, as guarantor countries, had previously agreed upon. After each agreement, Assad's troops attacked the Opposition and continued territorial conquests, thereby provoking forces around Idlib (officially the capital of the Opposition). At one point, they even forced the Turkish army to withdraw its observation posts, to which Ankara reluctantly agreed for the sake of peace in Syria. When, due to COVID-19, all countries were closed and support for various Syrian groups became too expensive, Russia and Turkey agreed in March 2020 to freeze the conflict – after which all sides, except Assad, decided to be satisfied with what they held under military control at that time. However, encouraged by the fact that it possesses air power, international support (a UN seat), and a wide range of allies and foreign mercenaries on the ground, Damascus decided to periodically continue attacks on Idlib using aviation and long-range projectiles that have been killing civilians in northern Syria for four and a half years. In short, the fact that the Assad regime ignored all international agreements, which it initially accepted, gave the Opposition both a moral and legal argument to launch an offensive towards Aleppo and its surroundings.

Assad long ignored Ankara's calls

Turkey has been actively involved in the conflicts throughout the war by siding with the Opposition. In recent months, Ankara came forward with a proposal for normalizing relations with Damascus, in exchange for a firm guarantee from Assad that he would actively work on incorporating under his administration the areas held by the SDF (a coalition gathered around the Kurdish YPG, which, besides them, includes other Kurdish militias, Arab, Turkmen, and Chechen tribes from eastern and northeastern Syria, and Armenian militias). Although, according to reports from Ankara, Assad ignored this call, it is a big question whether he even had the capacity for such an undertaking, given that there are several hundred American soldiers in the areas held by the SDF. Both the HTS and the SDF benefit from the failure of attempts at an agreement between Ankara and Damascus, which, after the vacuum created by the withdrawal of regime troops from Aleppo and its surroundings, pushed them into action. Besides the HTS and the SDF, the Opposition loyal to Ankara certainly does not benefit from the loss of the so-called buffer zone along the Turkish border, which probably, in coordination with Ankara, forced them to also seize the opportunity to expand southward, which they did today by capturing the small town of Tadif northeast of Aleppo.

The HTS phenomenon

Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS for short, is an Islamist militant group operating in northwestern Syria, particularly in Idlib province. It was formed in 2017 as a coalition of several groups led by the former Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria (Al-Nusra Front), created by the merger of Jaysh al-Ahrar (a faction of Ahrar al-Sham), Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Ansar al-Din Front, Jaysh al-Sunna, Liwa al-Haqq, and the Nur al-Din al-Zenki movement. Since then, HTS has evolved into the dominant military and political force in Idlib and is not directly subordinate to the political control of the Syrian Opposition, which primarily has its military and political power north of Idlib towards the Turkish border and is mostly in close cooperation with Ankara. Unlike the so-called moderate Syrian opposition (north of Idlib), as Western media popularly called it (because they follow a somewhat more liberal direction of political Islam and mostly emerged from the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood), officially HTS is not completely loyal to any country, although there are cells and groups that are in collusion with Turkey. This is a group that, due to the fact that it emerged from Al-Nusra (read: Al-Qaeda), has failed to gain sympathy from any of the neighboring countries, and has always been viewed with a degree of contempt and skepticism.

However, even in this regard, reality is not black and white. What surprised many and placed HTS among legitimate groups with which one can talk is that they drew certain lessons from the mistakes made in the past. Namely, this group, although never close in its radicalism to ISIL as some Western media suggested, decided to set aside its hard sectarian direction and, with a somewhat more liberal approach, win over the population they held under their administration (Christians, Sufi militias, and others). Certainly, HTS benefited from the fact that they had four and a half years of respite, which allowed them to profile themselves as a more serious military and political force, not just an ordinary sectarian militia. Forming a broad alliance with other groups (primarily Salafist) sorted things out at home and provided additional strength to open a front against the Regime. From the beginning of the conflict, Assad played the card of dividing various Islamist groups; however, the fact that he did not have direct access on the ground for a long time gave HTS enough time to turn mutual differences into a stronger anti-Assad alliance.

On the other hand, HTS was given an additional alibi for starting the offensive by the fact that they were completely ignored in the Astana peace process and are not signatories to any agreement, which Assad anyway brutally violated multiple times in his bloody attacks on the small area they held around Idlib. Assad never viewed HTS as exclusively Turkish allies like the 'moderate Syrian opposition', and the fact that many countries in the world officially declared them a terrorist organization gave him a legal and moral argument to continue, as he presented to the international public, “cleansing Al-Qaeda terrorist cells.” The previously mentioned negotiations between Ankara and Damascus regarding the transfer of territories 'Kurds for a buffer zone' did not bind them to any allied agreement with the Turks; moreover, they gave additional motivation for them to be recognized as a factor on the ground, because they are aware that such an agreement would be detrimental to them, as well as to the SDF itself, which is already visible on the ground where, besides HTS, it is precisely the SDF that has started conquering territories.

Exhaustion of the Assad regime

The war that has lasted nearly fourteen years has exhausted the regime in Damascus to the point of collapse. Over time, Assad turned his Syrian Arab Republic Armed Forces almost exclusively into an 'Alawite militia' (Alawites or Nusayris, to which the Assad family itself belongs, are a Shia sect comprising about 10-15% of the population), given that at the beginning of the war, a large part of the Sunni population (which makes up about 75% of the population) joined the ranks of the Free Syrian Army (the military branch of the Opposition). This forced the Regime to rely, besides its own military capacities, on a larger number of Shia mercenaries, including a whole echelon from Hezbollah, Iranian militias, and their loyal Afghan volunteers (mostly Shia, ethnically Hazaras, Persian-speaking from Afghanistan, originally Mongols), Iraqi volunteers (various paramilitaries loyal to Iran, such as Hashd al-Shaabi), a Druze militia from the south of the country, and a large part of Syrian Christians (again, ethnically and religiously divided into Arab Christians, Assyrians, Armenians, etc.). The fact that the war has been going on for too long, that Hezbollah has been disabled by the war in Lebanon, Iran is too busy with the simmering conflict with Israel and the USA, Russia is occupied with Ukraine, and the regime is under international sanctions, has weakened Assad's war capabilities the most. The fact that a small group of Alawites, which was never numerically sufficient for him to wage war against the absolute Sunni majority, and that all his allies are too exhausted and busy with their own problems, was well assessed by HTS that the ideal time for an attack had come, which was confirmed by the record capture of half of Aleppo and its surroundings.

Who benefits from the war, who does not?

First of all, this war diverts attention, at least briefly, from the perpetual conflicts in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Ukraine. It can be said with certainty that, although he cheered for escalations in the Middle East (ME), Putin will not be happy to see the eventual collapse of the allied regime in Syria, because besides the main lever in the ME, the Kremlin could lose its only military base in the Mediterranean (only the formation of a kind of 'Alawistan' in the vicinity of Latakia can prevent this scenario). Iran, at this moment when they have an active war (temporarily suspended) with Israel in Lebanon, also does not benefit from the loss of a regime that allows them to be a factor in Lebanon and have access to the Mediterranean. The fall of the Regime means cutting the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Southern Lebanon line. Especially considering the emergence of an increasingly pronounced anti-Iranian sentiment among Iraqi Shia. Saudi Arabia (SA) and other Gulf monarchies (Qatar is an exception here) do not want to see the formation of a Syria under the administration of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups, no matter how ironic that sounds given that SA itself is a theocratic monarchy.

Those who currently benefit relatively from the dynamics, though it may not be so tomorrow, are Israel and Turkey. Although it is difficult to predict in which direction the dynamics will unfold, the fact that an Iranian proxy is currently losing blood certainly pleases many in Tel Aviv. This will also weaken the edge of Hezbollah and Lebanon, which Israel hopes for. Theories that HTS has cooperation with Israel are theories spread by loyalists of the regime in Damascus to turn the sympathies of the Islamic world in their favor. In the long run, Israel does not want any state on its borders that will be governed by the principles of political Islam, even if it is the most liberal form of that idea. It is precisely Israel that advocates for the option of radicalizing HTS in order to gain an additional argument to turn its artillery in that direction and expand territorially, even if it only means consolidating around the Golan Heights. If HTS continues its successes, the activation of ISIL, which never completely disappeared, can be expected very soon. Besides Israel, the USA, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Russia, and most of all Assad himself, hope for such a scenario.

For Turkey, the development of current dynamics is as beneficial as it is potentially harmful if the SDF continues its expansion. The successes of the Opposition, but also of HTS, are good news for Ankara, which is probably currently lurking for an opportunity to become more actively involved in the war. On the other hand, anxiety for Ankara is caused by the fact that the SDF is also demonstrating similar success on the ground, and it is precisely this that is the reason why Ankara decided to build a buffer zone in the north of the country. An agreement between Ankara and Washington is undoubtedly necessary at this moment, because the USA is the only one with the capacity to force the SDF to behave more rationally. It is exclusively in the SDF's interest not to open a new front with the Turkish army, and the entire modern history is full of examples of sudden changes in the West's mood towards the Kurdish national question, which has usually pushed that people into additional agony.