Vučić-Thaci Agreement for Two Million New Refugees?

The International Institute for Middle Eastern and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyzes events in the Middle East and the Balkans. On the occasion of the initiative by the Presidents of Serbia and Kosovo on redrawing borders and the alleged end of the dialogue between official Belgrade and Pristina under the auspices of the EU, IFIMES has prepared an analysis of the current political situation and its repercussions on the region and the international community. From the analysis "Kosovo - Serbia Relations 2018: Vučić-Thaçi Agreement for Two Million New Refugees?", we highlight the most important and interesting parts.

During World War II, the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) was established. The victorious powers created a new world order, formalized by the establishment of the United Nations (UN). New states and new borders were created. The external borders of the FPRY were established as a consequence of World War II and the agreement of the great powers. The internal borders between the Yugoslav republics and provinces were consequently established and recognized by the same analogy.

The FPRY was eventually renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Later, the SFRY disintegrated, and the republics within the SFRY became independent and sovereign states, while the province of Kosovo declared its independence in 2008. This completed the architecture of borders in the former Yugoslav space and ended the Yugoslav crisis.

The Arbitration Commission within the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, better known as the Badinter Commission, took the legal stance that the borders between the former federal units (republics and provinces) are considered state borders of the newly formed states. There were even four wars aimed at redrawing borders, in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, and not a single border within the former SFRY was moved or changed by even a millimeter. The fact is that there are several cross-border disputes, but they are in the process of resolution or have already been resolved.

Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue with a Clear Goal

With the declaration of Kosovo's independence in 2008, problems between the newly formed Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia intensified. Due to this, the international community, under the auspices of the EU, initiated a dialogue between official Belgrade and official Pristina in 2011. The dialogue has shown modest results so far, as there have been obstructions by the dialogue participants in segments that suited individual parties – the dialogue participants. The prolongation of the dialogue allowed certain politicians political survival. Therefore, the deadline for the end of the dialogue and the conclusion of a legally binding agreement between Serbia and Kosovo is the first half of 2019. The complication arose when the Brussels Dialogue provided for the establishment of the Community of Serb Municipalities (CSM) in northern Kosovo, mainly inhabited by a majority Serb population. The Constitutional Court of Kosovo determined that the proposed Statute for the establishment of the CSM contradicts certain provisions of the Kosovo constitution. In addition to the disputed provisions in the proposed Statute for the establishment of the CSM, the key factor was the political opposition to the formation of the CSM by certain political parties, primarily the Self-Determination Movement - Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (LVV), which assessed that the formation of the CSM would inflict irreparable damage on the statehood of the Republic of Kosovo, as the CSM would represent a kind of entity within Kosovo itself, resembling the Republika Srpska entity within the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to the Self-Determination Movement, several other political parties warned of this danger, and the project for the formation of the CSM was halted.

Official Belgrade insists on the formation of the CSM, as it considers it key to preserving the Serb community in Kosovo, which is only partially true, as about 1/3 of all Serbs in Kosovo would live in the CSM, while the remaining 2/3 would live in other parts of Kosovo. The CSM would be institutionally connected with the authorities in Belgrade. This creates a model of special and parallel ties between the CSM and Serbia, similar to the special ties between the Republika Srpska entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. In the meantime, the Special Court for the prosecution of crimes committed by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA-UČK) has begun its work, which is expected to prosecute key individuals in Kosovo's political life from among the Albanians, including Kosovo President Hashim Thaci, Speaker of the Kosovo Assembly Kadri Veseli, and likely Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj, and many other high-ranking officials. The Special Court is a kind of single-ethnic court, as it is intended to try only Albanians, which represents a legal nonsensicality. Kosovo's political leaders even launched an initiative to abolish this court, which was withdrawn under strong international pressure. The Brussels Dialogue is precisely the lever by which the current political leadership of Kosovo postpones the de facto operation of the Special Court.

The Brussels Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina had the ultimate goal of normalizing relations and mutual recognition of the two states, which would primarily enable Serbia's faster progress towards EU membership and a series of financial benefits, while for Kosovo it would mean a path towards UN membership. Even if that were the case, there are still other obstacles that could arise for Kosovo's membership in the UN, namely the veto of permanent UN Security Council members, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. Since 2/3 of UN member states do not recognize Kosovo, the issue of UN admission cannot gain support even in the UN General Assembly.

In the overall situation, Serbia, as a self-proclaimed neutral country, is intensively arming itself, while the Kosovo government is a minority government, as it lacks adequate support in the Kosovo Assembly, and Kosovo President Hashim Thaçi does not enjoy the support of the citizens. Analysts believe that the solution to the current situation is early elections in Kosovo, which would show the real balance of political forces in that country.

Vučić-Thaçi Agreement for Two Million New Refugees

Since Aleksandar Vučić and Hashim Thaçi, on their own initiative, took over the leadership of the dialogue instead of the Prime Ministers of Serbia and Kosovo, they have launched an initiative for the correction or redrawing of borders, which in their vocabulary means a historical demarcation between Serbs and Albanians. Vučić and Thaçi have suspended the constitutional role of the prime minister and stolen state institutions, and unconstitutionally introduced a presidential system in their countries. They have also received support for this initiative from certain countries. The demarcation would be carried out by exchanging territories and populations in such a way that northern Kosovo would belong to Serbia, and in that case, the formation of the CSM would no longer be necessary, while a larger part of the Preševo Valley (Preševo, Medveđa, and Bujanovac) would belong to Kosovo, which it did until 1956 and which is treated as "Eastern Kosovo" in Kosovo.

Reaching such an agreement would cause mass population displacement, create ethnic borders, and according to Vučić and Thaçi, establish a permanent demarcation between Serbs and Albanians, thus solving the problem in their opinion. Analysts warn that this would not solve the problem but would cause new conflicts, suffering, tragedies, and at least two million new refugees. The Prime Minister of Albania, Edi Rama, is also involved in this initiative. He is surrounded by his advisors from Kosovo who had excellent connections with Milošević's regime in the 1990s, and Vučić and Dačić were part of that regime and now symbolize that regime. The Kosovo opposition has strongly opposed this initiative and is demanding that President Thaçi abandon this adventure, which could cost Kosovo dearly, and has requested an emergency session of the Kosovo Assembly on this issue. Even Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj has opposed this initiative, stating: "Any redrawing of borders and exchange of territories is an invitation to new tragedies in the Balkans and could cause instability and undermine long-term political and security investments in peace in Kosovo and the region.".

Since the past wars in the former SFRY were fought precisely for borders, and despite the wars fought, those borders were not moved or changed, only new problems are emerging. The primary question is whether the de facto problems would be solved in such a way, while these countries supposedly have ambitions to become EU members. The EU itself is based on diversity, and many EU member states are multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multi-confessional, which is why the Vučić-Thaçi initiative is anti-civilizational and anti-European. Nevertheless, behind such an agreement lie Vučić's intentions to save Slobodan Milošević's failed Greater Serbia project as much as possible. Vučić and Ivica Dačić precisely symbolize Milošević's policy from the 1990s, which would mean that the annexation (loss) of parts of Kosovo's territory would be compensated by the annexation of parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, called Republika Srpska.

This project also includes certain parts of Montenegro and even Croatia. Pro-Serbian parties in Montenegro, members of the opposition Democratic Front (DF), along with the Serbian National Council, are already creating such an atmosphere by launching a signature collection campaign for a petition to annul the decision by which Montenegro recognized the Republic of Kosovo.

The realization of such an agreement between Vučić and Thaçi would cause tectonic shifts in the region, new conflicts, suffering, tragedies, and a new refugee wave, which would affect at least two million people who would have to seek refuge mainly in EU countries, primarily in Germany and Austria. Therefore, whoever supports such an agreement must take responsibility for the consequences of such an agreement.

However, at this moment, Macedonia is more important for Vučić's project. Since Aleksandar (Vučić) is late in arriving in Kosovo to resolve the issue of Kosovo, he will focus his activities on Macedonia.

Is Aleksandar (Vučić) Arriving Late in Macedonia Too?

Macedonia has always been included in the Greater Serbian state project. It is not surprising that Serbia recognized Macedonia only on April 8, 1996, i.e., after the end of the wars and the collapse of Milošević's Greater Serbian state project.

Furthermore, in the events surrounding the formation of the new Government of the Republic of Macedonia, led by Zoran Zaev (SDSM), Serbian security and intelligence structures participated in the obstructions, and in the incident in the Sobranje on April 27, 2016, when an assassination attempt was made on Zoran Zaev and several of his associates, Serbian BIA officials were involved. At that time, Goran Živaljević, security advisor at the Serbian Embassy in Skopje and a BIA officer, was also present in the Sobranje. Živaljević was, incidentally, the deputy director of the Security Information Agency (BIA) of Serbia.

The regime of Nikola Gruevski and Saša Mijalkov closely cooperated with the regime in Belgrade. Numerous transactions and money withdrawals from Macedonia were carried out through Serbia and with the help of Serbian authorities. Serbia was one of the few countries that did not support the agreement reached between Macedonia and Greece, which resolves the decades-long dispute over Macedonia's constitutional name. Even Russia supported the agreement reached with Greece, as did the controversial Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Even Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić announced the withdrawal of recognition of the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name.

The joint session of the Governments of Serbia and Macedonia has been postponed several times. Bilateral meetings of high-ranking officials or ministers are a rarity. Serbia even appointed the controversial Rade Bulatović, former director of the BIA, as its new ambassador to Macedonia. At the same time, Serbia has increased its (para)intelligence presence in Macedonia. Media controlled by Aleksandar Vučić constantly spread disinformation and lies about Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev and his closest associates.

The new Government of the Republic of Macedonia has managed to achieve significant foreign policy successes and consolidate the situation within the country in just one year. The Minister of Interior of Macedonia, Oliver Spasovski, has contributed significantly to this, managing to strengthen Macedonia's security and intelligence system so that it can adequately counter security and intelligence attacks on the country. Due to the referendum, which will be held on September 30, 2018, Serbia has increased the presence of its (para)intelligence apparatus in Macedonia. The referendum will finally confirm the agreement with Greece, and no one will be able to stop Macedonia's path to NATO and EU membership. Serbia opposes Macedonia's membership in NATO, considering it a threat to its national interests. On the other hand, the Serbian-Russian Humanitarian Center in Niš is openly operating, which effectively represents the embryo of a Russian military base in Serbia and poses a direct threat to Macedonia and Kosovo.

However, the key reason why Serbia has increased the presence of its (para)intelligence apparatus in Macedonia is the attempt to prevent a successful referendum, because after a successful referendum, the canonical recognition of the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MPC) will follow. This year, the Ohrid Archbishopric (MPC-OA) celebrated 1000 years of existence. Since Orthodox churches are national churches, after the successful referendum on the country's name, the canonical recognition of the MPC will also occur. The Serbian authorities act in symbiosis with the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), and it is clear why they want to prevent the canonical recognition of the MPC.

Perfidiousness of Vučić's Policy in Macedonia

Although at first glance it may seem that Vučić's current policies focus on Kosovo and Republika Srpska (BiH), his intentions towards Macedonia are hidden in the background. The perfidiousness of Vučić's policy towards Macedonia is also illustrated by the fact that on September 2, 2018, Vučić met with Macedonian Prime Minister Zaev at the Preševo - Tabanovce border crossing, where an integrated international border crossing for passenger and freight traffic will be built, while at the same time he is working to disintegrate that country.

Therefore, it is necessary to stop the initiative of Vučić and Thaçi and their intentions to redraw borders. The Kosovo Parliament will adopt a resolution on September 4, 2018, at an extraordinary session, prohibiting Kosovo President Thaçi from raising issues of demarcation and discussing the exchange of territories and population transfers on behalf of Kosovo. It is expected that the Kosovo Assembly will also initiate the impeachment of Kosovo President Thaçi, as he is acting unconstitutionally and endangering Kosovo's territorial integrity. The best response to Vučić will be given by the citizens of Macedonia, who will confirm the signed agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece of June 18, 2018, in the referendum, thus, in addition to accelerating the path to NATO and EU membership, opening the way for the canonical recognition of the MPC and correcting the historical injustice towards the MPC. This will complete the statehood of the Republic of Macedonia and ensure the future for all its citizens.