Facts about Croatia's participation in the war in BiH

By: doc. dr. Goran KOVAČEVIĆ

The fact that Croatia has become a member of the EU does not absolve it of responsibility for the atrocities committed on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor does it give it the right to position itself as the measure of things in the region. It should be stated in particular that Croatia must not take the liberty to harm the reputation of our country and that its government representatives should not present false information about Bosnia and Herzegovina as a threat to EU security.

Official authorities in BiH should consider legal mechanisms as a way to prevent the damage that the malicious policy of the Republic of Croatia could cause to our country in the eyes of the world public.

The truth will set us all free, and the truth is that Croatia was an aggressor in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that is how we should treat it, because I see no remorse whatsoever.

Facts about Croatia's participation in the war in BiH

On December 27, 1991, a meeting on this issue was held in Zagreb, chaired by Franjo Tuđman, in the presence of numerous representatives of Croats from BiH and Croatia. Tuđman announced at the very beginning that the goal of the meeting was to determine "the strateg(y) of Croatian policy, Croatian policy as a whole, and therefore also of the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina".

At that meeting, Stjepan Kljuić advocated for the creation of a unified BiH, divided into cantons. Mate Boban advocated for the establishment of HZ HB as an independent entity that should eventually be annexed to Croatia. At the end of the meeting, President Tuđman criticized Stjepan Kljuić's stance, stating that it was too close to Alija Izetbegović's stance; he also reminded that Croats wanted the "Banovina Croatia" to be mentioned in the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia; finally, he expressed the opinion that the Muslims would be satisfied with a small state in the rest of BiH. He also stated that "it is time to seize the opportunity to gather the Croatian national being within the maximum possible limits", claiming that BiH, in fact, prevents the realization of a truly independent Croatia.

On February 9, 1992, the leadership of HDZ Croatia and HDZ BiH, at a meeting in Livno, raised the issue of uniting all Croats of BiH with Croatia. At that meeting, it was agreed that HDZ BiH would submit a request to the Government and Parliament of Croatia to grant Bosnian Croats Croatian citizenship and the right to vote in elections organized in Croatia, with the aim of creating an "indestructible entity" between Croats.

An armed conflict that breaks out on the territory of one state and which, at first glance, appears to be of an internal nature, can nevertheless be considered international if another state intervenes in that conflict with its own troops or if some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other state.

Evidence shows that, under pressure from the international community, Croatia either attempted to conceal the presence of the HV in BiH or tried to justify it by saying that the HV members in that territory were volunteers. However, the report of Ivan Kapular, commander of the Osijek military district, dated July 23, 1993, states that the parents of HV soldiers demonstrated against sending their children to the "southern battlefield" and, based on the order of Ivan Kapular, commander of the 5th Guard Brigade of the HV, 26 members of the 4th Motorized Brigade of the HV were disciplined for refusing to go to the "southern battlefield" on October 22 and November 11, 1993.

The "southern battlefield", according to the evidence, extended to a part of the so-called HZ HB.

The evidence further discussed in the text confirms the fact that Croatia paid salaries to HV members who were deployed in BiH.

There is considerable evidence from representatives of the international community, local witnesses, or in the form of documents from local authorities, which confirms the presence of HV forces on the "southern battlefield". Even the ICTY has established in its judgments that the HV participated in the conflicts between ABiH and HVO.

For example, the soldiers who attacked Prozor on October 23, 1992, were from Split, Grude, and Livno, and were part of a mixed unit of HVO and HV, although all members of that unit wore HVO insignia. This information has been confirmed from multiple sources, which state that on October 23, 1992, HVO and HV forces captured Prozor. There are also witnesses and documentation from international organizations confirming that HV forces were present in the Prozor area on several occasions between November 1992 and January 1994. The same applies to the municipality of Gornji Vakuf in the village of Sovići.

The presence of the HV has also been recorded in Mostar. There are HVO documents stating that the HZ HB authorities tried to conceal the presence of the HV in Mostar by ordering members to remove HV insignia from their uniforms. Furthermore, members of the EU Observation Mission and UNPROFOR personnel observed the presence and direct intervention of HV forces in BiH, particularly in the Mostar area throughout 1993.

Regarding the Heliodrom camp, there are numerous testimonies from individuals who were detained at Heliodrom and who saw members of the HV brigades "Gromovi" and "Tigrovi" stationed at Heliodrom at various times between May and December 1993. In addition to these, there is other evidence that also confirms the presence of HV members in that detention camp between August 1993 and January 1994. Likewise, statements from several witnesses and documents from the international community confirm the presence of HV forces in Ljubuški between May and October 1993.

As for Stolac and Čapljina, the situation is identical. There is evidence that HVO, HOS, and HV members occupied positions abandoned by Serbs in Stolac, meaning that the HV was present in the municipalities of Stolac and Čapljina during the summer of 1992. In addition, numerous pieces of evidence confirm the presence of HV forces in the Čapljina area from the summer of 1992 to July 1993, although only until the summer of 1992 in the Stolac area.

In legal terms, there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the HV directly intervened in the conflict between HVO and ABiH on the side of HVO in the municipalities of: Jajce, Kreševo, Busovača, Vitez, Novi Travnik, Travnik, Kiseljak, Fojnica, Kakanj, Vareš, Kotor-Varoš, Tomislavgrad, Livno, Kupres, Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Prozor, Konjic, Jablanica, Posušje, Mostar, Široki Brijeg, Grude, Ljubuški, Čitluk, Čapljina, Neum, Stolac, and parts of Skender-Vakuf (Dobretići) and Trebinje (Ravno). This means that, given this direct intervention, it can be concluded that the conflict between ABiH and HVO had the characteristics of an international armed conflict.

Evidence of indirect intervention and general control by Croatia

Peter Galbraith, former US Ambassador to Croatia, stated that Croatia appointed and dismissed generals and high-ranking officials of the HVO. There is evidence confirming this thesis, which shows that individuals who held the highest positions in the HVO, such as Milivoj Petković, Slobodan Praljak, and Žarko Tole (all three were commanders of the Main Staff at different times, as well as Ivan Kapular, deputy commander of the Main Staff), were simultaneously officers of the HV.

In addition to the aforementioned, there are other senior HVO officers who were simultaneously members of the HV. For example, Željko Šiljeg, commander of the Northwest Herzegovina Operational Zone of the HVO, was a colonel in the HV. Vladimir Primorac, from the 145th Brigade of the HV, served as deputy commander of the 3rd Battalion of the Military Police of the HVO, and Nedjeljko Obradović, who was the commander of the 1st Brigade "Knez Domagoj" of the HVO on January 21, 1993, was assigned to the 116th Brigade of the HV on the same date. Stanko Sopta, a colonel in the HV, held the position of deputy commander of the "Kažnjenička bojna" (Punitive Battalion) of the HVO and commander of the 3rd Brigade of the HVO.

Joint command of military operations by the HV and HVO

According to the testimony of Hague witness Ciril Ribičić, HZ HB coordinated its military activities with Croatia. In addition, there is evidence showing that HV commanders issued orders to HVO units for military operations, and that Gojko Šušak attended meetings with the leadership of HZ HB in his capacity as Minister of Defense of Croatia.

Submission of HVO reports to Croatian authorities

There is much evidence indicating that the HVO submitted reports on its activities to the Croatian authorities and/or the HV, such as a report from mid-September 1993, in which the leaders of Herceg-Bosna/HVO informed Franjo Tuđman that no single Muslim remained in Stolac and that Croats from central Bosnia had been settled in the town, occupying Muslim houses.

Existence of logistical support from Croatia

There is undisputed evidence confirming that Croatia provided logistical and financial support in the armed conflict in BiH, which included financial support, sending weapons and equipment, and assistance in training and expertise.

Financial support, sending weapons and equipment

There is clear evidence indicating that the Croatian Ministry of Defense also supplied weapons, equipment, and sent funds to the HVO.

Assistance in training and expertise

The HV Military Police provided assistance to the HVO Military Police in terms of training and organizing work. The Ministry of the Interior of Croatia also organized training programs for the HVO police, which is a generally known fact.

Political aspects of Croatia's general control over HVO and HZ HB

The general control that Croatia had over the HVO and the authorities of HZ HB also had political aspects and consisted specifically in Croatia's control and indirect influence over the HVO and HZ HB.

There is evidence showing that the international community, from May 1992 until the Washington Agreement, often asked the Croatian leadership, especially President Tuđman, to influence the leadership of HZ(R) HB to cease hostilities between HVO and ABiH. Peter Galbraith himself personally asked President Tuđman and Mate Granić on several occasions to intervene to guarantee international organization representatives access to HVO detention centers, to guarantee freedom of movement for humanitarian convoys in BiH, and to stop abuses by the HVO.

Likewise, the UN Security Council and General Assembly asked the Croatian leadership to use all the influence it had over the leadership of HZ HB to stop violations of international law in BiH. Numerous pieces of evidence show that, as a result of these pressures, the Croatian leadership did indeed take steps to ensure that the leadership of HZ(R) HB fulfilled the demands of the international community.

According to parts of the available witness statements, as well as representatives of the international community, and according to statements by Peter Galbraith, former US Ambassador to Croatia, Franjo Tuđman believed that BiH as a sovereign and independent state should cease to exist and that a significant part of BiH's territory should be annexed to Croatia's territory. Josip Manolić, a high-ranking Croatian official, specified that Franjo Tuđman wanted the annexation of western Herzegovina because that part of BiH's territory was "ethnically pure" and bordered Croatia. Therefore, it is an undisputed fact that Franjo Tuđman advocated for the division of BiH between Croatia and Serbia, in such a way that a part of BiH would be annexed to Croatia or, if that were not possible, by having an autonomous Croatian territory within BiH that would be closely connected with Croatia.

It is a known fact that in the period from 1990 until at least the end of 1992, Franjo Tuđman met several times, including on March 25, 1991, in Karađorđevo, with the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, to finalize "plans" for the division of BiH between Croatia and Serbia: most Bosnian Croats would become part of Croatia, and most Bosnian Serbs would become part of Serbia, leaving Bosnian Muslims only a small autonomous zone around Sarajevo.

In addition, it should be taken into account that on May 6, 1992, representatives of Bosnian Serbs, including Radovan Karadžić, Momčilo Krajišnik, and Branko Simić, and representatives of Bosnian Croats, including Mate Boban, met in Graz regarding the division of BiH in accordance with the borders of Banovina Croatia, defined by the Cvetković-Maček agreement of 1939.

On November 28, 1992, Franjo Tuđman convened a meeting in Brijuni (Croatia), attended by, among others, Herbert Okun and Gojko Šušak, at which Franjo Tuđman and Gojko Šušak repeatedly mentioned the division of BiH between Serbs and Croats.

Therefore, when everything is summed up, it can be concluded that from November 18, 1991, until April 1994, and perhaps even after that, several individuals, including Franjo Tuđman and other officials, military or civilian in the Croatian Government, initiated and participated in a joint criminal enterprise of political and military expulsion of Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and other non-Croats who lived in those parts of BiH claimed to belong to HZ HB, for the purpose of permanently removing that population from those parts of BiH, ethnic cleansing of those areas, and annexation of those territories as part of "Greater Croatia", in the short term or over a longer period, so that they would become part of the Republic of Croatia or be closely connected to it.

This goal was to be achieved through the use of force, intimidation or threat of force, persecution, imprisonment and detention, forced displacement and deportation, seizure and destruction of property, and through other criminal means, as well as other means that include the commission of such criminal offenses. The general goal of the JCE was to establish Croatian territory within the borders of Banovina Croatia, a territorial entity that existed from 1939 to 1941.

A specific goal of the JCE was to create a political and national map of these areas so that they would be dominated by Croats, both politically and demographically.

After all, Franjo Tuđman, as President of Croatia, was aware of these persecutions, deportations, and forced displacement of the Muslim population in BiH, and intended for these acts to be committed, in the interest of changing the demographic picture and achieving his goal of creating Greater Croatia.

Therefore, all of this indicates that Croatia was indeed involved in the war events in BiH with a specific goal, which was to divide BiH territorially between Croatia and Serbia and for it to cease to exist as a state. Unfortunately, this plan still exists, only its actors are changing.