Analysis of Azerbaijan's counter-terrorism operation in Nagorno-Karabakh

Written by: Dean Džebić

Deja vu is the best description of the swift and lightning-fast success of Azerbaijani policy, implemented by the Azerbaijani armed forces in the conflict with the military formations of the self-proclaimed Astrakha, or rather, with the remnants of the Armenian army.

To Baku's accusations that not all forces and remnants of the Armenian army had withdrawn from Nagorno-Karabakh, official Yerevan responded negatively. On September 19, Azerbaijan launched a counter-terrorism operation with the aim of destroying the remnants of the Armenian army, as well as the military formations of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh.

The fact that Azerbaijan was thoroughly preparing for this operation is indicated by the massive troop movements and heavy equipment recorded from the interior of Azerbaijan towards the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The night before the operation began, TikTok and a whole series of other social platforms were shut down throughout Azerbaijan, meaning the operation had an information platform aimed at preventing the release of news that would harm Azerbaijani troops.

Suggestively, the day before the operation began, Azerbaijan sent a convoy of humanitarian aid to Nagorno-Karabakh, demanding the removal of the blockade on the Agdam – Stepanakert road.

In the morning, Armenian forces on the front line were heavily shelled, dominated by Soviet D-30 towed howitzers of 122 mm caliber and 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers of 122 mm caliber. Stepanakert, the capital of the self-proclaimed state of Artsakh, was also heavily shelled. It should be noted that the civilian population of Stepanakert was informed about the shelling via messages urging them to stay away from the military positions of the Armenian army to avoid casualties during the shelling.

From the perspective of international humanitarian law, selective targeting for military necessity and proportional use of force, informing the civilian population represent significant precautionary measures.

The city of Stepanakert itself, or Khankendi (the name the city bore until 1992 when the Azerbaijani population was expelled), is considered by official Baku to be the center of the rebellion, given that the Armenian side considers it the capital of the self-proclaimed republic.

As an introduction to the deployment of drones that marked the 2020 war, previously identified positions of the Armenian army's air defense were hit and destroyed through reconnaissance. Among the first targets was the Russian Tor-M1 short-range system, with a range of up to 25 kilometers, in the suburbs of Stepanakert. The next target was the electronic warfare and jamming system RP-377LA “Lorandit,” which was hit in the deployment area for the defense of Stepanakert, or Khankendi.

By the end of the day, drones and kamikaze drones destroyed another Tor-M1 with P-18 radar stations with a range of over 200 kilometers. The approaches to Stepanakert were defended by the 4th Infantry Brigade of the Armenian army with well-fortified positions and an engineer-prepared front line, which will be shown in footage from the Azerbaijani army's drones.

On the political level, in consultation with the President of Turkey, the President of Azerbaijan, Aliyev, had full control of the situation on the ground. Given that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan convened his first press conference only in the afternoon, while the situation on the ground was largely in favor of the Azerbaijani side.

Despite denying the existence of Armenian army units, the UAV war of 2020 recorded new hits on vehicles, artillery positions, and fortifications of the Armenian army every hour.

In the north, the positions of the 5th Infantry Brigade of the Armenian army near Aghdere were annihilated by strong artillery fire and the destruction of a logistics base on the communication route towards Agdam.

In the second phase of the operation, on the first day, the Azerbaijani Air Force also joined, as there was no longer a threat from the ground given the destroyed electronic warfare systems and air defense systems. By the end of the first day of the operation, over 20 Armenian defense strongholds were breached, with captured equipment and technology, and a larger number of villages and towns under Armenian army control were liberated.

For the first time, Azerbaijani forces used the Belarusian MLRS of the “Polonez” type, caliber 300 millimeters, carrying out precise strikes on Armenian army targets. By the end of September 20, the entire Armenian army forces were annihilated in less than 24 hours and forced to disarm and withdraw.

Stepanakert itself, or according to all indications, Khankendi again, is within reach of Azerbaijani forces, who are taking over place by place in their sweep of the territory. The final assessment is therefore a complete victory for Azerbaijan, which has militarily resolved the issue of the frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The tears and anger of Armenians in front of the Russian Federation's embassy in Yerevan did not change the course of this almost asymmetrical conflict.

Moreover, members of the Russian peacekeeping mission were killed in the crossfire of the Armenian army, and the embassy in Yerevan has been blocked for days while diplomatic and consular staff have been withdrawn to Russia. Therefore, Russia has also lost its war in the Caucasus, as well as its irretrievable reputation.

Deja vu in the Caucasus perhaps best illustrates the recent conversation between Presidents Erdogan and Aliyev, in which the Turkish President, asking for the name of the city between two mountains, Khankendi, asked his colleague: “Do you have hotels there?” President Aliyev's answer is being realized today: “We don't, but we will build them soon.” And that is deja vu in the Caucasus.