Analysis: Can the results of the Budva elections spill over to the state level and will Vučić reconcile the pro-Serbian coalitions

Written by: Nevena Kovačević

Local elections in Budva were held on Sunday. Citizens of Budva elected local authorities for the third time in four years. Preliminary results indicate that long and uncertain negotiations lie ahead, but also that the Budva fiasco of the Europe Now movement can significantly affect the functioning of the executive branch.

According to preliminary results, two pro-Serbian coalitions each won nine seats: "For the Future of Budva," composed of the New Serbian Democracy, Democratic People's Party, Socialist People's Party, Movement for Changes, United Montenegro, True Montenegro, Free Montenegro, DEMOS, and the Workers' Party led by Mladen Mikijelj, and the coalition "Budva Our City," headed by Nikola Jovanović, who is close to the arrested mayor Milo Božović, who is actually the controller and leader of the coalition.

These are two factions of what was once a unified, but now divided, Budva government. To make the paradox even greater, Milo Božović is still the formal president of the municipal committee of Andrija Mandić's New Serbian Democracy, even though they ran separately in Sunday's elections. The real conflict is actually between Mandić and Božović, with reasons being both personal and financial in nature. Former comrades have been exchanging the harshest accusations for months, and these disagreements ultimately led to the final collapse of the government formed after the 2022 elections.

The Democrats won 4 seats, the Europe Now movement two, and Dritan Abazović's URA one. Analyzing the results, there is a clear decline in support for the parties that make up the state government, or were part of the government after the parliamentary elections held in 2020. The biggest loser of the Budva elections is undoubtedly the Europe Now movement.

On the other hand, the Democratic Party of Socialists, which has not been a constituent of the local government since 2016, recorded a significant increase in support, while the newly formed coalition of SDP, SD, and LP, in its first electoral appearance, achieved a percentage of support sufficient for a seat in the local parliament.

Comparative data

Although both Andrija Mandić and the leader of Božović's list, Nikola Jovanović, declared victory on Sunday evening, it seems only Jovanović has reason to celebrate, while Mandić's team, if they do not overcome serious disagreements, could easily remain outside the government. However, both sides should ask themselves what led to a drop in support for pro-Serbian parties in Budva by as much as ten percent compared to the previous elections. The Democrats also won about 300 fewer votes, but managed to retain the number of their previous seats.

The Democratic Party of Socialists won seven seats – two more than in the previous elections, in a coalition appearance of pro-Montenegrin parties. This time, the DPS ran independently, with Nikola Milović at the head of the list. Given the significant progress and number of seats won, the DPS is a good address for negotiations and could become part of the government, through minority support or direct participation. The coalition SDP, SD, LP appeared in elections for the first time and, by winning one seat and parliamentary status, showed that it is beginning to build an exceptionally good foundation for future electoral cycles and expanding the electorate, both at the local and state levels.

Fiasco of PES

Although it is awkward to compare local and parliamentary elections, in the case of Milojko Spajić's Europe Now movement, only by comparing these two electoral cycles can the collapse of the ruling party at the state level be illustrated. Namely, PES won only seven percent of the votes in the Budva elections, i.e., two seats, which is three times less than the number of votes in Budva in the parliamentary elections.

Spajić's party entered this electoral process rather reluctantly, without party infrastructure and with a list composed, it seems, just for the sake of form. They tried to compensate for the personnel deficit with institutional support – the list bearer was Predrag Zenović, Montenegro's chief negotiator with the European Union. Contrary to forecasts, the institutional foundation did not strengthen PES's electorate. On the contrary, it made the political defeat even more painful. On one hand, the populist-economic campaign that had crucially influenced the earlier rapid growth of support at the local level and, ultimately, the takeover of state power, was absent.

The other side of the coin is the inconsistent policy of the Government, primarily of Prime Minister Spajić, who does not give up on the poor balance between implementing declarative Europeanism and fulfilling the wishes of the coalition's Russian-Serbian agents. Obviously, Spajić's "paf paf" methodology caused dissatisfaction among both pro-Serbian and part of the sovereignist voters who believed in the pro-European orientation of PES.

Will Vučić reconcile the warring sides

As stated at the beginning, turbulent negotiations await us, with possible twists and various combinations. Viewed from the current perspective, Nikola Jovanović, the leader of Milo Božović's list, composed predominantly of municipal cadres, has the best chance of forming a government, primarily because he did not narrow the coalition potential by refusing cooperation with certain parties. In contrast, Andrija Mandić decisively stated that he will not negotiate with the DPS, while from the other pro-Montenegrin coalition it was stated that an agreement with Mandić, i.e., the ZBB coalition, is not an option for them. Thus, even with the support of PES, URA, and the Democrats, Mandić's coalition would not gather the 17 councilor seats needed to form a Budva majority.

Jovanović, if a pro-Serbian agreement is not reached, could easily form a government, with minority support or direct participation of the DPS, and one councilor from the SDP. Another option is an agreement with the Democrats, URA, PES, and the SDP, and it is not excluded that some constituents of the ZBB coalition, less loyal to Mandić, might side with Jovanović. We are used to comfortable armchairs erasing differences.

Although Mandić, with his statement about a great victory of the Serbian people, tried to quickly smooth over the ongoing conflict of the pro-Serbian group, a quick reconciliation seemed unlikely, until the leader of all Serbs publicly promised to help overcome the animosity. Namely, in the show "Ćirilica" on HAPPY television, after Milan Knežević, commenting on the situation in Budva, said that they wouldn't be Serbs if they weren't quarreling, Vučić replied – "we'll fix that."

And so the Budva negotiations gained a completely new dimension. Given Vučić's active participation in electoral processes in Montenegro and BiH, bringing in suspicious individuals, arrests, turning off cameras at border crossings, media-propaganda battles, and especially the successful infiltration of pro-Russian structures into Montenegro's legislative and executive branches, the interference of the Serbian leader is entirely expected. It seems the region doesn't even need elections. It is enough for the leader to make a list and distribute functions, thus saving enormous funds invested in election propaganda. And since Andrija Mandić consistently implements orders (Vučić's commands), it seems that if he wants his coalition to remain in power, he will have to count to ten and reluctantly agree to a solution whereby Jovanović would get the position of mayor. So, if Vučić reconciles the warring DF sides, other entities will remain in the opposition. Rather than repeating elections, it is more realistic to expect the formation of an unprincipled, armchair government.

The fact that pro-Serbian parties, despite a drop in support or an increase in the number of abstainers, still have majority support from Budva citizens, nevertheless shows that there are no significant deviations in Budva compared to 2022, when the unified DF had an absolute majority.

Reflections on state government

There is no doubt that the fiasco of Spajić's PES will result in strengthening the blackmail potential of Andrija Mandić and Milan Knežević towards the current prime minister. On the other hand, Spajić would have to take the Budva message very seriously, if his goal is the survival of PES on the political scene, especially given the fact that extraordinary Podgorica elections are very likely coming soon. At a time when pro-Serbian parties demand that the vote on the Srebrenica resolution be compensated as soon as possible with a resolution on Jasenovac, and Montenegro is threatened by the Croatian blockade of IBAR, Spajić would have to put his finger to his forehead and think carefully. Continuation of unprincipled day-to-day political trading and pandering to Mandić and Knežević, or a return to the Western course. Servitude to Belgrade, or a historic step towards Brussels. The Western or Greater Serbian embrace, the choice is Spajić's. The moment of decision is here, and time is running out.